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ARTICLES
Exclusionary Zoning:
Mount Laurel In New York?
Terry Ricet
I. Introduction
The Mount Laurel decisions of the New Jersey Supreme
Court, Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mount Laurel,' constitute the most extreme treatment in the
country of the controversial issue of exclusionary zoning. In spite
of New York's more traditional approach to the question of the
impact of zoning ordinances on housing opportunities, the
Mount Laurel decisions are stimulating increased pressure on
New York courts to react in a manner less deferential to the
traditional presumptive authority of a municipality to formulate
its own land use policies. Although appellate courts in New York
have declined to require that municipalities provide opportuni-
t B.A., College of William and Mary, 1972; J.D., Albany Law School, 1975; Village
Attorney, Village of Suffern, New York; Town Attorney, Town of Tuxedo, New York;
Private Practitioner, Suffern, New York.
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1. The first Mount Laurel decision, which will be referred to as Mount Laurel I,
appears at 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975). The second
Mount Laurel decision, which will be referred to as Mount Laurel II, appears at 92 N.J.
158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983).
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ties for the housing of low income individuals, the stage has been
set in New York for an attack on zoning laws and restrictions
which do not provide for the accommodation of housing for
those on the lower stratum of the economic structure or which
displace such people in favor of the more wealthy.
In order to assess the possible impact of the Mount Laurel
decisions on New York law, an understanding of those decisions
is necessary. To ascertain the effectiveness of the mandates of
the New Jersey Supreme Court the methods and procedures uti-
lized by the Mount Laurel trial judges to enforce its obligations
must be reviewed. Lastly, the legislative response to the unpopu-
larity of judicial oversight of municipal zoning is instructive. A
comprehension of the evolutionary process of combating exclu-
sionary zoning in New Jersey is imperative for anyone proposing
a dramatic change in the New York exclusionary zoning law.
II. New Jersey Background
A. Mount Laurel I
In Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mount Laurel,2 the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed de-
cades of deferential treatment of municipal zoning activities and
determined that a developing municipality violated the New
Jersey constitutional mandate that zoning authority be exercised
in furtherance of the general welfare when it excluded housing
for lower income persons. By adopting zoning ordinances that
inhibit housing opportunities for the poor and advance local in-
terests at the expense of the rest of the state's citizens, a munici-
pality utilizes the police power for an unconstitutional purpose.3
The court held that the obligation to exercise zoning authority
in furtherance of the general welfare could not be satisfied
merely by eliminating exclusionary practices. This obligation
could only be satisfied by affording a realistic opportunity for
the construction within its borders of its fair share of the pre-
sent and prospective regional need for low and moderate income
housing. According to the court, every developing municipality
2. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151,
336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
3. Id. at 173-79, 336 A.2d 724-26.
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was required, through its land use regulations, to make realisti-
cally possible an "appropriate variety and choice of housing."'
The Mount Laurel I court did not, however, define what
constituted a "developing" municipality, what the relevant "re-
gion" consisted of, the manner in which "regional need" was to
be determined, nor how a municipality's "fair share" was to be
calculated. Although the decision constituted a strong policy
statement and an unequivocal condemnation of exclusionary
zoning, the ambiguity of procedures and methods to be em-
ployed stimulated both confusion on the part of those munici-
palities which wished to act in good faith and avoidance in those
which intended to preserve the status quo. The ambiguity of the
court's holding spawned years of litigation in which the court
retreated from its landmark position. The effect of this litigation
was to stimulate avoidance of the mandates of the Mount Lau-
rel I decision. In a subsequent decision, the court determined
that the construction of "least cost" housing was sufficient to
satisfy a municipality's Mount Laurel I obligation, even if low
and moderate income families could not afford to purchase those
units.' The supreme court further held that precise fair share
allocations were not necessary and that the proper inquiry for a
court was whether a municipality was making bona fide efforts
to remove exclusionary barriers.7 The court also determined that
the Mount Laurel I obligation did not apply to fully developed
single-family residential communities,8 and that a fully devel-
oped community was not required to grant use variances to per-
mit the construction of multi-family housing.9
4. Id. at 174, 336 A.2d at 724.
5. "Least cost" housing was defined as housing built at the least cost possible. Oak-
wood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 512-13, 371 A.2d 1192, 1206-
07 (1977). However, in many cases, "least cost" housing is not inexpensive enough for
lower income occupancy.
6. Id. at 510-17, 371 A.2d at 1206-09.
7. Id. at 499, 371 A.2d at 1200.
8. Pascack Ass'n v. Mayor of Washington, 74 N.J. 470, 485-87, 379 A.2d 6, 13-14
(1977).
9. Fobe Assocs. v. Mayor of Demarest, 74 N.J. 519, 379 A.2d 31 (1977).
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B. Mount Laurel II
Dissatisfied with the Township of Mount Laurel's lack of
progress in meeting the demand for low and moderate income
housing10 and with the "widespread non-compliance with the
constitutional mandate of our original opinion,"" the Supreme
Court of New Jersey determined in Mount Laurel II to use "a
strong judicial hand" to strengthen and clarify its earlier rul-
ing. 1 2 Although Mount Laurel I prohibited municipalities from
employing exclusionary zoning policies, Mount Laurel If im-
posed an affirmative duty on communities to assure that their
fair share of low and moderate income housing would be con-
structed.18 The Mount Laurel H decision, a consolidation of six
cases involving a spectrum of Mount Laurel I issues, encom-
passed three and one-half days of oral arguments and twenty-
five months of deliberation by the court. The lengthy 216 page
decision is, in part, a result of "the court's efforts to overcome
municipal resistance by explicitly setting forth what should be
done to satisfy the constitutional mandate." 4
The primary basis for the court's extraordinary determina-
tion is its perception of the permissible limits of a municipality's
exercise of the police power:
The constitutional power to zone, delegated to the municipalities
subject to legislation, is but one portion of the police power and,
as such, must be exercised for the general welfare. When the exer-
cise of that power by a municipality affects something as funda-
mental as housing, the general welfare includes more than the
10. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158,
198, 456 A.2d 390, 410 (1983). The court observed that:
After all this time, ten years after the trial court's initial order invalidating its
zoning ordinance, Mount Laurel remains afflicted with a blatantly exclusionary
ordinance. Papered over with studies, rationalized by hired experts, the ordinance
at its core is true to nothing but Mount Laurel's determination to exclude the
poor.
Id.
11. Id. at 199, 456 A.2d at 410.
12. Id.
13. Meisel, Guidelines for the Practitioner: The Impact of Mount Laurel II on New
Jersey Zoning and Planning Procedure and Practice, 14 SETON HALL L. REV. 955, 963
(1984).
14. Buchsbaum, No Wrong Without A Remedy: The New Jersey Supreme Court's
Effort to Bar Exclusionary Zoning, 17 URB. LAw. 59, 61 (1985).
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welfare of that municipality and its citizens: It also includes that
of the general welfare - in this case the housing needs - of
those residing outside the municipality but within the region that
contributes to the housing demand within the municipality. Mu-
nicipal land use regulations that conflict with the general welfare
thus defined abuse the police power and are unconstitutional. In
particular, those regulations that do not provide the requisite op-
portunity for a fair share of the region's needs for low and moder-
ate income housing conflict with the general welfare and violate
the state constitutional requirements of substantive due process
and equal protection. 3
The court stated that the basis for this constitutional obligation
is that "the State controls the use of land, all of the land. In
exercising that control it cannot favor the rich over the poor...
. While the State may not have the ability to eliminate poverty,
it cannot use that condition as the basis for imposing further
disadvantages." 6
The court emphasized what it saw as the imperative for its
obligation to act:
The clarity of the constitutional obligation is seen most simply by
imagining what this state could be like were this claim never to be
recognized and enforced: poor people forever zoned out of sub-
stantial areas of the state, not because housing could not be built
for them but because they are not wanted.' 7
Such a scenario was, in the opinion of the court, not only at vari-
ance with the requirement that the zoning power be exercised
for the general welfare, but also with "concepts of fundamental
fairness and decency that underpin many constitutional obliga-
tions."' 18 The court declared that the state may not merely au-
thorize municipalities to exercise zoning authority and then dis-
claim responsibility for problems and consequences which
result.' 9
The court recognized that it was venturing into an area
which "is better left to the Legislature,"' but based this intru-
15. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 208-09, 456 A.2d at 415.
16. Id. at 209, 456 A.2d at 415.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 209-10, 456 A.2d at 415.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 212, 456 A.2d at 417.
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sion into the legislative prerogative on its view that the legisla-
ture had abrogated its responsibility to protect important consti-
tutional rights. The New Jersey legislature adopted a number of
programs to stimulate or subsidize low income housing and had
entertained fair share allocation legislation, but had declined to
adopt the measure.2 It certainly can be argued that, by basing
its decision on legislative abrogation of responsibility, the court
was stretching its authority to the limit. "Acceptance of this ar-
gument [abrogation of legislative responsibility] would validate
judicial policymaking anytime the legislature fails to adopt a
particular program favored by a majority of the court, even
though the program does not have the support of a majority of
the elected members of the state legislature."2 Regardless of the
implications regarding the judicial legitimacy of its actions, the
court determined that the protection of constitutional rights
could not await the achievement of a political consensus. 3
Having determined the existence of a municipal obligation
to affirmatively provide a realistic opportunity for a fair share of
the region's present and prospective low and moderate income
housing, the court held that satisfaction of a municipality's
Mount Laurel obligation would be determined solely by an ob-
jective standard - a municipality would be required to provide
its specific numerical fair share.24 Henceforth, the good or bad
faith of a municipality would be irrelevant, as the court repudi-
ated the numberless "bona fide" standard. The housing in ques-
tion was required to be affordable to those eligible for section 8
housing programs,2 5 that is, by low income families (those whose
21. See Rose, New Additions to the Lexicon of Exclusionary Zoning Litigation, 14
SETON HALL L. REV. 851, 886 (1984).
22. Id.
The issue is confounded by the fact that there are no due process or equal
protection clauses in the New Jersey Constitution! Nevertheless, the New Jersey
Supreme Court, having determined in Mount Laurel I that there ought to be such
clauses, ruled that those clauses were inherent in the state constitution.
Id. at 865.
23. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 212, 456 A.2d at 417.
24. Id. at 221, 456 A.2d at 421.
25. The term "Section 8 Housing Programs" refers to the Federal Section 8 Housing
Program, Section 8, U.S. Housing Act of 1937, (P.L. 73-479), as amended by Housing
and Community Development of 1974, (P.L. 93-383). The program consists, primarily, of
rent subsidies for lower income families and rehabilitation of substandard housing to
produce adequate housing for such families. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(b)(2) (1937) for the
[Vol. 6:135
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incomes do not exceed fifty percent of the median income of the
area) and moderate income families (those whose incomes are no
greater than eighty percent and no less than fifty percent of the
median income of the area). 6 The court delineated affordability
as requiring that a family pay no more than twenty-five percent
of its income for such housing.
In addition to the requirement that certain municipalities
satisfy their fair share of the regional need, all municipal land
use regulations were required to provide a realistic opportunity
for decent housing for its indigenous poor (except where they
represent a disproportionately large segment of the population
as compared with the rest of the region). "The zoning power is
no more abused by keeping out the region's poor than by forcing
out the resident poor."2
In order to determine which municipalities are required to
house the region's poor, the court abandoned the "developing
municipality" standard of Mount Laurel I and embraced the
State Development Guide Plan (SDGP), a state-wide planning
document which divided the state into six areas: growth, limited
growth, agriculture, conservation, pinelands and coastal zones.
"By clearly setting forth the state's policy as to where growth
should be encouraged and discouraged, these maps effectively
serve as a blueprint for implementation of the Mount Laurel
doctrine. 2 9 The Mount Laurel regional fair share obligation ap-
plies only to communities located wholly or partly in "growth"
areas.3 0 The intention of the court in utilizing the SDGP was "to
Section 8 definitions of "lower income families" and "very low income families" which
roughly correspond to the Mount Laurel terms "moderate income families" and "low
income families."
26. Id. at 221 n.8, 456 A.2d at 421 n.8.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 214, 456 A.2d at 418.
29. Id. at 226, 456 A.2d at 424.
30. The SDGP is not, however, conclusive in every case. Recognizing that the SDGP
was not specifically prepared for Mount Laurel use, a municipality may, in "unusual"
cases, prove that "the locus of the Mount Laurel obligation is different from that found
in the SDGP." Id. at 240, 456 A.2d at 431. Such a municipality would be required to
demonstrate that the conclusion that the municipality contains a growth area is arbitrary
and capricious, or that the municipality has undergone a significant transformation since
preparation of the map which renders the designation inappropriate. Id. at 240, 456 A.2d
at 431-32. A party seeking to vary the SDGP designations has a "heavy burden." Id. at
215, 456 A.2d at 418.
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channel the entire prospective lower income housing need in
New Jersey into 'growth areas.' "31 As a result, in the view of the
court, the "obligation to encourage lower income housing, there-
fore, will hereafter depend on rational long-range land use plan-
ning (incorporated into the SDGP) rather than upon the sheer
economic forces that have dictated whether a municipality is
'developing.' ,,32
When determining a community's fair share, three issues
must be addressed: the relevant region must be identified, the
present and prospective housing needs must be determined, and
an allocation of those needs among the municipalities involved
must be made. While the decision is not quite as vague as
Mount Laurel I in discussing these issues, it was left to the trial
courts to determine the precise parameters of the relevant re-
gion, need and allocation. True to its word, however, the Mount
Laurel H court did provide some guidance in making these de-
terminations. Region was defined to be "that general area which
constitutes, more or less, the housing market area of which the
subject municipality is a part, and from which the prospective
population of the municipality would substantially be drawn, in
the absence of exclusionary zoning. '33 Special circumstances
would be required in order for the trial court to vary the defini-
tion. In determining fair share, the court favored formulas which
accord substantial weight to new employment and tax ratables,
while it disfavored formulas that rely upon the effect of past ex-
clusionary practices.
In order to determine these issues and to make fair share
allocations, three judges would hear all Mount Laurel litigation.
It was expected by the court that a regional pattern for each
judge's area and, eventually, for the entire state would emerge,
resulting in a consistent determination of regional needs. The
determination of region and of regional need made by any of the
three judges is to be presumptively valid and binding on all mu-
nicipalities in the region. The court anticipated that, ultimately,
"fair share" litigation would be limited to the issue of proper
31. Id. at 244, 456 A.2d at 433.
32. Id. at 215, 456 A.2d at 418.
33. Id. at 256, 456 A.2d at 440 (quoting Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of
Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 543, 371 A.2d 1192, 1219 (1977)).
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allocation among municipalities.34 "Along with this consistency
will come the predictability needed to give full effect to the
Mount Laurel doctrine. 35
C. Required Action
To satisfy its Mount Laurel obligations, a municipality
must, at the very least, remove all municipally created barriers
to the construction of its fair share of lower income housing. To
the extent necessary to achieve this, a municipality must remove
all zoning and subdivision restrictions and exactions that are not
necessary to protect the public health and safety. Compliance
with the mandates of Mount Laurel may frequently require
more than the elimination of unnecessary cost producing restric-
tions, that is, affirmative measures will be required in order to
make housing opportunities realistic. Such measures may in-
clude: encouraging or requiring the use of available state or fed-
eral subsidies, mandatory set-asides,3 6 and overzoning. Recogniz-
ing that "the construction of lower income housing is practically
impossible without some kind of governmental subsidy, '37 a trial
court may require a municipality to cooperate with a developer's
efforts to obtain a subsidy and may require the granting of tax
abatements in appropriate situations.
The court determined that because incentive zoning 8 leaves
a developer free to build only upper income housing if he so
desires, sole reliance on incentive zoning may prove to be insuffi-
cient. Mandatory set-asides39 are considered by the court to be a
more effective inclusionary device which a municipality must
utilize if it cannot otherwise satisfy its fair share obligation.
Mandatory set-asides are favored by the Mount Laurel court
34. Mount Laurel 11, 92 N.J. at 216, 456 A.2d at 419.
35. Id.
36. A mandatory set-aside is a requirement that developers include a minimum
amount of lower income housing in a development. Id. at 266, 456 A.2d at 445.
37. Id. at 263, 456 A.2d at 444.
38. Incentive zoning is "offering economic incentives to a developer through the re-
laxation of various restrictions of an ordinance (typically density limits) in exchange for
the construction of certain amounts of low and moderate income units." Id. at 266, 456
A.2d at 445. Incentive zoning is commonly accomplished by the use of density bonuses
that increase density as the amount of lower income housing is increased. Id.
39. See supra note 36.
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when subsidies are not available. 40 The court acknowledged the
problem of keeping lower income units available for the poor
over time, that is, the owner or tenant of a unit may be tempted
to rent or sell the unit at its full value. If a municipality is to
satisfy its Mount Laurel obligations, it must ensure that those
units remain available to those for whom they are intended.
There are two methods suggested by the court to ensure availa-
bility. First, construction of "no-frills" apartments which would
be sold to low income purchasers at a price close to market value
thereby eliminating the opportunity of sale to higher income
persons, and, second, the use of rent control or covenants and a
public trust to ensure that the units are available only at lower
income levels.
An additional affirmative measure which the court required
a municipality to consider is "overzoning," that is, "zoning to
allow for more than the fair share if it is likely, as it usually is,
that not all of the property made available for lower income
housing will actually result in such housing."' 1 In addition, the
court required that if a municipality has been otherwise unable
to meet its Mount Laurel obligation, it must zone for low-cost
mobile homes:
[W]e do not hold that every municipality must allow the use of
mobile homes as an affirmative device to meet its Mount Laurel
obligation, or that any ordinance that totally excludes mobile
homes is per se invalid .... [I]f compliance can be just as effec-
tively assured without mobile homes, Mount Laurel does not
command them; if not, then assuming a suitable site is available,
they must be allowed.42
In the rare instances when special conditions, such as ex-
tremely high land costs, make it impossible to otherwise satisfy
a municipality's fair share obligation after all alternatives have
been explored and all affirmative devices considered, "only when
everything has been considered and tried," the Mount Laurel
obligation may be satisfied by the construction of "least-cost"
housing.43 Although such housing will be unaffordable by those
40. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 267, 456 A.2d at 446.
41. Id. at 270, 456 A.2d at 447.
42. Id. at 276, 456 A.2d at 450.
43. "Least-cost" housing is the "least expensive housing that builders can provide
[Vol. 6:135
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in the lower income brackets, it will provide shelter for families
who could not otherwise afford housing in the suburban market:
"[a]t the very minimum, provision of least cost housing will
make certain that municipalities in 'growth' areas . . . do not
'grow' only for the well-to-do."'4 While the form of least cost
housing may vary, any municipality utilizing such a measure is
required to zone significant areas for housing that most closely
approaches lower income housing, that is, in the opinion of the
court, mobile homes.
D. Judicial Remedies
If a trial court determines that a community has failed to
comply with its Mount Laurel obligation, it must order the mu-
nicipality to revise its zoning law. If the municipality does not
comply, the court is empowered to utilize remedies which are
radical compared to the customary zoning remedies. In all cases
where the successful plaintiff is a developer, a builder's remedy
is authorized. The builder's remedy has been defined as "a form
of redress by which a builder-plaintiff in exclusionary zoning lit-
igation is compensated for damages suffered as a result of the
invalid zoning ordinance by a judicial order permitting him to
proceed with his proposed development, subject to prescribed
conditions. 4
When a prevailing plaintiff-developer proposes to construct
a project containing a substantial amount of lower income hous-
ing, a "builder's remedy" will ordinarily be granted unless the
municipality establishes that, as a result of environmental or
other substantial planning concerns, the proposed project is con-
trary to sound land use planning.4" The public interest is
thereby served by encouraging litigation to challenge zoning or-
dinances not in compliance with the court's mandate. Recogniz-
ing that public interest organizations lack the resources to bring
a sufficient number of cases to provide effective enforcement of
after removal by a municipality of all excessive restrictions and exactions and after thor-
ough use by a municipality of all affirmative devices that might lower costs." Id. at 277,
456 A.2d at 451. See also supra note 5 and accompanying text.
44. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 277, 456 A.2d at 451.
45. Rose, supra note 21, at 870.
46. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 279-80, 456 A.2d at 452.
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Mount Laurel obligations, the court sought to increase the in-
centives for developers to pursue Mount Laurel litigation by en-
couraging the award of builder's remedies.
When invalidating a noncomplying ordinance, the trial
court is directed to order the offending municipality to incorpo-
rate affirmative measures into its new law. The decision specifi-
cally requires that the revisions be completed within ninety days
from judgment. To facilitate the revision, the court may appoint
a special master who is required to make his recommendations
and report to the trial court.47
If a municipality fails to produce a timely and constitution-
ally acceptable ordinance, then the court may order far-reaching
relief, including:
1. requiring that the municipality adopt particular amend-
ments to enable it to comply with its Mount Laurel obligations;
2. delaying certain types of projects or construction until
its ordinance is satisfactorily revised or until its fair share of
housing is constructed or firm commitments obtained;
3. voiding the municipality's land-use regulations in whole
or in part to relax or eliminate building and use restrictions in
all or portions of the municipality; and
4. requiring that particular applications to construct hous-
ing that includes lower income units be approved by the appro-
priate municipal agencies.48
These remedies, which amount to an intrusion of an unprec-
edented degree into municipal zoning authority, will be invoked
after a municipality's zoning regulations have been found to be
constitutionally void and after the municipality has failed to sat-
isfactorily revise its zoning ordinance.
In order to eliminate the potential for years of delay in com-
plying with a municipality's Mount Laurel obligation resulting
by virtue of appeal, followed by enactment of a second poten-
tially invalid ordinance and another round of time consuming
litigation, all questions are to be resolved in one proceeding with
but one appeal. Following a court's invalidation of its ordinance,
a municipality may revise its ordinance "under protest" and ap-
peal the propriety of the original order that declared the ordi-
47. Id. at 281-84, 456 A.2d at 453-55.
48. Id. at 285-86, 456 A.2d at 455.
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nance to be invalid. A judgment of compliance shall have res
judicata effect for a period of six years despite any change in
circumstances. This procedure, in the opinion of the court, as-
sures that "the Mount Laurel obligation is to provide a realistic
opportunity for housing, not litigation.""9
Although the Mount Laurel decisions cut deeply into one of
the most imperative preserves of municipal home rule, their re-
quirements do not completely deprive a municipality in a
growth area of the power to control the character of its commu-
nity. Once a municipality has complied with its Mount Laurel
obligation, it is required to do no more. Having complied, a mu-
nicipality's land-use regulations may continue to contain restric-
tive provisions incompatible with the provision of lower income
housing, such as bedroom restrictions, large lot zoning, and
prohibitions against mobile homes. Such provisions will not be
held invalid because of the requirements of Mount Laurel. "Mu-
nicipalities may continue to reserve areas for upper income
housing, may continue to require certain community amenities
in certain areas, may continue to zone with some regard to their
fiscal obligations: they may do all of this, provided that they
have otherwise complied with their Mount Laurel obligations." 50
Moreover, in order to prevent a drastic change in the character
of the community, the court specifically recognized that a mu-
nicipality may, in appropriate circumstances, be permitted to
"phase-in" its fair share of the housing need over a number of
years.'
Although the court went to great lengths to mollify citizens
and government officials, the conclusion is inescapable that the
prerogatives of local government in New Jersey has been drasti-
cally curtailed. For example, by requiring municipalities to elim-
inate "excessive" zoning and subdivision restrictions and exac-
tions, the court effectively deprived municipal legislative bodies
of the authority to control the character of the community or to
require developers to bear the cost of public improvements.
"Anti-look-alike" 5 ordinances and similar regulations which at-
49. Id. at 352, 456 A.2d at 490.
50. Id. at 260, 456 A.2d at 442.
51. Id. at 215, 456 A.2d at 420.
52. "Anti-look alike" zoning provisions "seek to prevent ugly and monotonous rows
1986]
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tempt to preserve a particular aesthetic quality in a community
are presumed to be cost-generating devices that, in the view of
the New Jersey courts, are not necessary to protect the public
health and safety and must, therefore, fail. Similarly, it may be
assumed that a New Jersey court may consider the rationale for
a number of other restrictions to be insufficiently related to the
public health and welfare and to be too costly in terms of devel-
opment costs to survive its scrutiny. These include minimum lot
size, other area and bulk requirements, preparation of environ-
mental impact statements, specifications for road construction,
hook-up fees, time consuming application procedures or, per-
haps, installation of public improvements. The absence of such
regulations certainly makes housing more affordable to the pur-
chaser, but those costs, both economic and societal, must be
borne by the taxpayers and residents of the community. Simi-
larly, the requirement that land be "overzoned" in certain cir-
cumstances in order to create an oversupply of less costly resi-
dential land is the antithesis of sound planning. Comprehensive
and rational planning are assigned a subservient position.
The presumptive grant of a builder's remedy to a successful
developer-plaintiff who will construct low income housing in-
volves the judiciary in the legislative affairs of a municipality to
an unprecedented extent. Moreover, the remedy which, in effect,
grants a building permit to the developer, deprives municipal
boards from injecting sound planning into the project, and pre-
vents such boards from mitigating undesirable effects of the
development.
Although Mount Laurel II firmly established the broad pa-
rameters to be applied to allegedly exclusionary zoning laws, a
myriad of issues remained unresolved. The panel of three Mount
Laurel trial judges was left to formulate the methodology re-
quired to implement the principles announced by the court.
Their decisions illustrate the practical difficulties encountered in
the enforcement of such a revolutionary "right" and in the
of identical houses which are thought to encourage urban decay as well as to mar the
beauty of the whole community. A representative section authorizes denial of a building
permit where the planned structure is excessively similar to an existing or permitted
structure within 250 feet of the proposed site." 1 ANDERSON, NEW YORK ZONING LAW AND
PRACTICE § 8.41 (3d ed. 1984).
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courts' attempts to bring rationality and predictability to such a
controversial and emotional arena. These decisions, until re-
cently unreported, supplement and clarify Mount Laurel II and
are particularly relevant to any attempt to assess the impact of
Mount Laurel II on future zoning challenges in New York State.
It is the application of the principles announced in Mount Lau-
rel II which most clearly reflects the strengths and weakness of
this revolutionary decision.
E. Fair Share Determination
1. Fair Share Methodology
The first Mount Laurel H case to be fully tried in New
Jersey since the Mount Laurel II decision was AMG Realty Co.
v. Township of Warren.53 This case permitted the court to ad-
dress the most important of the many issues left unresolved by
the Mount Laurel II decision, namely, the method of determina-
tion of fair share allocation. Mount Laurel H established that
for exclusionary zoning to be eliminated, voluntary compliance
with the constitutional mandate must be encouraged, litigation
to vindicate that obligation must be simplified and judicial rem-
edies made more effective.H The promulgation of a fair share
methodology by Judge Serpentelli, one of the three designated
Mount Laurel judges," was designed to promote voluntary com-
pliance so that each affected municipality could calculate its fair
share obligation and adopt zoning laws to satisfy that
obligation."'
Similarly, Judge Serpentelli foresaw that setting forth such
a methodology would simplify litigation and create a more effec-
tive judicial remedy because the most time consuming and ex-
pensive aspect of Mount Laurel II litigation - the determina-
tion of fair share - would be virtually eliminated from
controversy. The court recognized that the adopted methodology
merely represented the beginning of a refinement process that
53. No. L-23277-80 PW (N.J. Super. Ct. July 16, 1984).
54. Mount Laurel H, 92 N.J. at 218, 291, 456 A.2d at 420, 458.
55. The three judges designated to hear Mount Laurel disputes are Judges
Serpentelli, Skillman and Gibson.
56. AMG Realty Co. v. Township of Warren, No. L-23277-80 PW, slip op. at 10-11
(N.J. Super. Ct. July 16, 1984).
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should serve as the impetus for planners and attorneys to im-
prove upon or replace.57 Realizing that the planning community
could have debated over equally reasonable alternatives for
years, Judge Serpentelli stated that prompt judicial resolution of
the Mount Laurel H issues was required to implement the con-
stitutional mandate of Mount Laurel H. 
58
2. Region
In order to derive a municipality's fair share allocation, it is
first necessary to circumscribe the "region" of which the munici-
pality is a part. The Mount Laurel II decision provided only
general guidance in defining a region as "that general area which
constitutes, more or less, the housing market area of which the
subject municipality is a part, and from which the prospective
population of the municipality would substantially be drawn, in
the absence of exclusionary zoning. '59 In declining to provide
further guidance, the supreme court recognized that the deter-
mination of such issue was better left to the experts who would
participate in future Mount Laurel II litigation."
The experts testifying in the AMG trial advanced two con-
ceptual approaches to delineate region, the fixed line and com-
mutershed approaches. "[A] commutershed approach defines a
region by starting with the functional center of the municipality
and identifying all points that could be reached during a reason-
able commuting time by travelling outward in all directions on
existing roadways." 61 Such an approach would necessitate sepa-
rate analysis for each municipality. On the other hand, a "fixed
line approach defines a region through rigid lines derived by an-
alyzing the standards for an appropriate region as articulated in
Mount Laurel II.""
In order to define region for the appropriate inquiry, Judge
Serpentelli adopted a dual region concept, "widely embraced by
members of the planning community as being much more reflec-
57. Id. at 78.
58. Id. at 78-79.
59. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 256, 456 A.2d at 440 (quoting Oakwood at Madison,
Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 543, 371 A.2d 1192, 1219 (1977)).
60. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 256, 456 A.2d at 440.
61. AMG Realty, No. L-23277-80 PW, slip op. at 12 (N.J. Super. Ct. July 16, 1984).
62. Id. at 11-12.
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tive of the goals expressed in Mount Laurel H than any single
region concept," 63 consisting of a present need region and a pro-
spective need region. Recognizing that there is practical diffi-
culty in formulating one region which would achieve all the
objectives of Mount Laurel H, the court observed:
[A] region which focuses on enabling people to live in proximity
to their work may satisfy prospective housing demands, but it
may be too small to provide the resources necessary to absorb the
excess present need generated by the urban areas. Conversely, a
region which focuses on providing the resources necessary to ab-
sorb the excess present need of the urban areas may be too large
to accurately address the prospective housing demand. 4
The present need region, defined by the boundary of the county
in which the municipality is located, is "intended to balance the
high levels of need in the older urban core municipalities of that
region and the resources to meet that need in the less dense and
newer suburban areas of the region." 5
The prospective need region was determined to be a modi-
fied commutershed area which would be large enough to accom-
modate special commuting patterns or employment concentra-
tions.6 6  Such prospective regional need was to be the
"commutershed measured in all directions from the functional
center of a municipality based on a thirty minute drive time. '6 7
The functional center is to be the generally recognized commer-
cial-residential core of a community, that is, the "downtown
area. ' 8 In the absence of a commercial-residential core in a
community, the functional center is to be considered to be the
community's municipal building.6 9 Absent either of the above,
the functional center is viewed to be the major crossroads within
the municipality.70 The entire area of any county is considered
63. Id. at 31.
64. Id. at 30.
65. Id. at 12.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 13. "The thirty minute drive is measured by the following speeds:
1. 30 miles per hour on local and county roads, 2. 40 miles per hour on state and federal
highways, 3. 50 miles per hour on interstate highways, the Garden State Parkway and
the New Jersey Turnpike." Id. at 14.
68. Id. at 13.
69. Id. at 13-14.
70. Id.
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to be within a municipality's commutershed if a thirty minute
drive would enter the county at any point.Y
3. Present Regional Need
A municipality's present need consists of two components:
the indigenous need within the municipality, and its fair share
of the reallocated excess need of the municipality's present need
region. The AMG court defined "indigenous need" as "substan-
dard housing currently existing in any municipality." 72 Mount
Laurel II required all municipalities, regardless of their designa-
tion in the SDGP, to provide for their indigenous needs. 73 Since
some municipalities have an indigenous need which exceeds
their fair share, "[tihey should not be expected to provide de-
cent housing for a disproportionate share of the need. 7 4 Accord-
ingly, when the percentage of the total regional housing stock
which is substandard is calculated, any municipality whose in-
digenous need in relation to its housing stock is in excess of that
regional need will have its excess assigned to a reallocation
pool. 75 Such excess need will be allocated to municipalities
which contain an area designated as a growth area in the SDGP.
One of the most persistently contested issues in Mount
Laurel H litigation has been the identification of substandard
units. According to the AMG decision, a housing unit is consid-
ered substandard if it possesses any of the following
characteristics:
1. Overcrowded units - defined as dwelling units occupied by
more than 1.01 persons per room.
2. Units lacking complete plumbing facilities for the exclusive
use of the occupants.
3. Units lacking adequate heating. 71
An unduplicated count of such units can be ascertained from the
71. Id. at 14.
72. Id.
73. Mount Laurel H, 92 N.J. at 214-15, 456 A.2d at 418.
74. AMG Realty, No. L-23277-80 PW, slip op. at 14 (N.J. Super. Ct. July 16, 1984).
75. Id. at 14-15. Excess need is reallocated whether the municipality is designated
by the SDGP as being in a growth area or not. Id. at 14; Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 243-
44, 456 A.2d at 433.
76. AMG Realty, No. L-23277-80 PW, slip op. at 15 (N.J. Super. Ct. July 16, 1984).
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1980 census. To obtain the number of substandard units occu-
pied by lower income households, that is, the indigenous need,
the AMG court held that the number of substandard units must
be multiplied by .82, a factor to reflect that eighteen percent of
the substandard housing in New Jersey was considered not to be
occupied by low and moderate income families.7 7
The court required a number of comparisons in order to de-
termine whether a municipality may transfer a portion of its in-
digenous need to the excess pool and, if so, the extent to which
it may. Initially, the number of substandard units in the present
need region must be expressed as a percentage of the total hous-
ing stock of the region (denominated as "regional substandard
housing percentage"). Next, the number of substandard units
for each municipality in the present need region must be calcu-
lated as a percentage of each municipality's housing stock (de-
nominated as "municipal substandard housing percentage"). To
the extent that the percentage of substandard units in any mu-
nicipality exceeds the regional percentage, those units are reallo-
cated to the excess pool of present need and will be reallocated
to municipalities in growth areas through the utilization of pre-
sent need allocation factors. 8
4. Prospective Regional Need
While the methodology of the AMG court considers any
need generated prior to 1980 which still exists to constitute pre-
sent need, prospective need refers to the households expected to
be formed between 1980 and 1990:79
[T]he prospective need is calculated by projecting population in-
creases by age cohort through the averaging of two projection
models, applying a headstart rate to obtain the number of house-
holds expected to be formed and by multiplying that number by
the percentage of the population which is classified as lower
income.80
77. Id.
78. Id. at 16.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 43. See also id. at 17.
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5. Present Need Allocation
The court relied upon three factors in order to determine
the manner in which the surplus present need of municipalities
is to be redistributed from the excess pool: growth area, present
employment, and medium income. The growth area factor is the
percentage determined by dividing the number of growth area
acres within a municipality by the number of growth area acres
within the present need region.8' The purpose of the growth fac-
tor is to consider the physical capacity of a municipality to pro-
vide land for new construction by identifying the areas within a
municipality which have been designated by the SDGP as ap-
propriate for development.82 Although the court recognized that
a municipality's ability to accommodate development would be
more appropriately measured by examination of the amount of
vacant developable land within the growth area, the lack of reli-
able data prohibits the use of this method.83
The present employment component is determined by di-
viding the total number of 1982 private sector jobs covered by
unemployment compensation within a municipality by the total
number of covered jobs within the present need region. 4 This
component recognizes the concern of the Mount Laurel II court
that individuals be able to reside in decent housing in the vicin-
ity of their place of employment. 5 It represents the present
housing demand to the extent that the existence of jobs creates
the need for housing. Judge Serpentelli also noted that this fac-
tor "may also reflect a policy of exclusion which has existed for
many years because some towns have invited factories but ex-
cluded the workers."8 6
The medium income aspect of the formula is the ratio of
medium income of a municipality to the medium income of the
present need region.8 7 Mount Laurel H recognized that compli-
81. Id. at 18.
82. Id. at 49.
83. Id. at 50.
84. Id. at 18.
85. Id. at 51; Mount Laurel H, 92 N.J. at 210-11 n.5, 456 A.2d at 415 n.5.
86. AMG Realty, No. L-23277-80 PW, slip op. at 51 (N.J. Super. Ct. July 16, 1984).
87. Id. at 18. In rejecting objections to the use of an economic factor, Judge
Serpentelli determined that, "[wlhile I have some reservations as to whether further ex-
perience will demonstrate that this factor will accomplish its objectives, those concerns
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ance with its mandates might impose substantial financial bur-
dens on municipalities. 8  The impact of medium income is
designed to consider a community's ability to afford the expense
of the construction of the public improvements and infrastruc-
ture required for high density construction, and to seek to equi-
tably distribute such burdens.89 Similarly, the factor seeks to
identify prior exclusionary practices, and to reward past inclu-
sionary efforts recognizing both that a municipality must plan
for all income levels, and that "fairness requires that prior inclu-
sionary construction ... should be rewarded."90
The data used in such calculations must exclude non-growth
municipalities from the regional computation. The resulting per-
centage when multiplied by the regional reallocation pool results
in a municipality's fair share of that need."1
6. Prospective Need Allocation
The allocation formula employed to allocate prospective re-
gional need utilizes the same three factors as in the present need
allocation formula,92 but includes a fourth determinate, employ-
ment growth. Employment growth is the percentage calculated
by dividing the covered employment growth from 1972 to 1982
within a municipality by the covered employment growth within
the prospective need region for the same period."' The employ-
ment growth factor is utilized to predict future job growth.94
The court found that this element accurately measures employ-
ment trends, and reflects the land-use policies of a municipal-
are overridden by the importance of having an economic indicator which mirrors fiscal
capacity, prior exclusion, and most importantly, past inclusion." Id. at 54.
88. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 265, 456 A.2d at 445.
89. AMG Realty, No. L-23277-80 PW, slip op. at 52 (N.J. Super. Ct. July 16, 1984).
90. Id.
91. Because the other factors are expressed as percentages, the medium income ratio
must be converted to a percentage. In order to accomplish such a conversion, the first
two factors must be averaged to create one percentage which is multiplied by the me-
dium income ratio. The result is averaged along with the first two percentages by divid-
ing the sum of factors one, two and the converted third factor, by three to create a single
percentage. The resulting number is multiplied by the total reallocation pool for the
region to determine the municipality's fair share of that pool. Id. at 18-19.
92. See supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
93. AMG Realty, No. L-23277-80 PW, slip op. at 19 (N.J. Super. Ct. July 16, 1984).
94. Id. at 60.
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ity.9 The court considered that the use of the two employment
factors in the prospective need formula would mitigate against
unfair conclusions which might result from the utilization of
only employment growth.96
7. Fair Share Calculation
A municipality's fair share allocation can, accordingly, be
calculated by utilizing the allocation formulas, and combining
the indigenous, the surplus present and the prospective need
figures. In addition, however, the court requires that an adjust-
ment be made to the surplus present and prospective need
figures to compensate for inadequate vacant developable land,
and for vacancy rates.97 These need determinations are required
to be increased by twenty percent to compensate for the loss of
housing units resulting from the reduction of fair share alloca-
tions due to the absence of adequate developable land in various
municipalities. 8 In addition, an unoccupied reserve was man-
dated by the court to permit mobility.9 9 In the event that fair
share allocations exactly matched need, one could not move un-
less someone else vacated their residence to make room for
them. Thus, the court provided for sufficient vacancies to facili-
tate mobility in housing choice by increasing the need factor by
three percent.100
The Mount Laurel II decision authorized the trial judge to
allow the fair share obligation to be phased-in over a number of
years.10' Judge Serpentelli, however, was of the opinion that the
95. Id.
96. Id. A municipality which historically had little employment, but experienced a
recent, sudden burst of employment might, according to an example posed by the court,
be assessed an unrealistically high fair share allocation in the absence of an employment
growth factor.
The computation of a municipality's prospective fair share obligation is computed in
a manner similar to its present need allocation. The medium income factor must be ex-
pressed as a percentage by averaging the first three factors to obtain one percentage
which is multiplied by the medium income ratio. The resulting percentage must be aver-
aged with the other three factors by dividing the same by four. The resulting percentage
is multiplied by the prospective regional need to obtain the prospective need. Id. at 20.
97. Id. at 23.
98. Id. at 46.
99. Id. at 48.
100. Id.
101. Mount Laurel H, 92 N.J. at 219, 456 A.2d at 420.
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circumstances of each case should dictate whether the court
should exercise its discretion to permit such deferral of a munic-
ipality's obligation - the phasing-in of present need should not
be automatic.102
Recognizing that the formulas utilized can be challenged for
a variety of reasons, the court held that "[the pivotal question
is not whether the numbers are too high or low, but whether the
methodology that produces the numbers is reasonable." 103 More-
over, the methodology must also be "sufficiently structured to
produce consistent results and it must be sufficiently flexible to
deal with extreme cases at both ends of the spectrum."' 0 ' The
102. AMG Realty, No. L-23277-80 PW, slip op. at 43 (N.J. Super. Ct. July 16, 1984).
103. Id. at 74.
104. Id. at 76. The following will illustrate the determination of the "fair share"
methodology utilized in AMG Realty:
Application of Fair Share Methodology to Warren Township
1. Region
The present need region for Warren (Region I) consists of eleven counties ....
The prospective need region for Warren consists of ... six counties ....
2. Regional Need
The indigenous need for Warren is 52. The eleven county reallocated present need
pool is 35,014 and the six county prospective need is 49,004.
3. Allocation Factors
-Present Need
Using the eleven county present need region, Warren's fair share of the realloca-
tion pool of 35,014 is 162 for the decade of 1980-1990 based upon the following
calculation.
Warren's present need percentage of the present regional need is 1.126%
which is arrived at as follows:
Growth Area = 1.780%
Present Employment = .179%
Median Income ratio = 1.45
(1.780 + .179)/2 = .9795 x 1.45 = 1.420%
([this] represents the percentage modified by the ratio)
(1.780 + .179 + 1.420)/3 = 1.126%
Reallocation Excess Pool = 35,014 x 1.126 (fair share %)
Municipal Share = 394
Phased in by one third (394/3) = 131
Additional 20% reallocation (131 x 1.2) = 157
Vacancy allowance (157 x 1.03) - 162
Total Present Need is:
(Indigenous) 52 + (Reallocated Present) 162 = (Total) 214
-Prospective Need
Warren's fair share of the prospective regional need of 49,004 is 732 units for
the decade of 1980-1990.
Warren's prospective need percentage of the prospective regional need is
1.208", computed as follows:
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court believed that its methodolgy was flexible and not "blindly
rigid" because it permitted the vacant developable land defense
and rewarded communities which had made inclusionary efforts
through the utilization of the medium income factor and direct
credits." 5
Utilizing the methodology adopted by it, the court deter-
mined that Warren Township's total fair share obligation was
946 units.106 Warren Township would be required to remove all
excessive restrictions and exactions precluding construction of
its fair share if its ordinances were to be found in compliance
with Mount Laurel 11.107 The affirmative measures set forth in
Mount Laurel II would be required if such action failed to gen-
erate realistic housing opportunites.10 8 It was undisputed among
the parties that the Warren Township zoning ordinances could
not produce the quantity of units required to satisfy its fair
share obligation. 109 Had the ordinance provided for sufficient
density, however, it might have been necessary to remove other
provisions which might be held to be an excessive restriction or
exaction. Among the provisions of the Warren Code which might
be considered to be excessive restrictions or exactions are: 1) a
requirement that all townhouses contain private garages; 2) a re-
Growth Area = 2.556%
Present Employment = .304%
Employment Growth = .428%
Median Income Ratio = 1.41
(2.556 + .304 + .428)3 = 1.096% x 1.41 = 1.545
([this] represents the percentage modified by the ratio)
(2.556 + .304 + .428 + 1.545)/4 = 1.208%
Prospective Regional Need = 49,004 x 1.208 = (fair share %)
Municipal Share = 592
Additional 20%
Reallocation (592 x 1.2) = 710
Vacancy Allowance (710 x 1.03) = 732
SUMMARY
(Total Present Need) 214 + (Total Prospective need) 732 = (Total Fair Share)
946
Id. at 25-28.
105. Id. at 77.
106. The total fair share determination consisted of an indigenous need of 52, id. at
26, present regional need of 162, id., and prospective need of 732. Id. at 27.
107. Id. at 63; Mount Laurel 11, 92 N.J. at 258-59, 456 A.2d at 441.
108. AMG Realty, No. L-23277-80 PW, slip op. at 63 (N.J. Super. Ct. July 16, 1984);
Mount Laurel 11, 92 N.J. at 260-74, 456 A.2d at 442-50.
109. AMG Realty, No. L-23277-80 PW, slip op. at 64 (N.J. Super. Ct. July 16, 1984).
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quirement that every townhouse have a significantly different
design from every other townhouse within 150 feet; 3) excessive
setbacks provision which could be cost generating or affect den-
sity by severely constraining the site layout; 4) front yard
screening; 5) broad discretion to deny site plan if the use is
deemed not to be in the public interest; and 6) inadequate flexi-
bility concerning road widths and other multiple dwelling
requirements.110
Although failing to rule on plaintiffs' allegations that the
thirty percent mandatory set-aside for lower income housing
provided by the defendant was not feasible, the court concluded
that:
For a mandatory set aside to be effective, the set aside must
be reasonable and the unit density must be reasonable. If the set
aside is reasonable and the density is reasonable, actual construc-
tion will result. If the set aside is too high or the density is too
low, no construction will occur because the project must be
profitable.1 '
F. Rutgers Report Fair Share Allocation
Subsequent to the AMG decision, Judge Skillman adopted a
different method of identifying the present need obligation of a
municipality other than the Urban League analysis utilized in
AMG. 112 In Countryside Properties, Inc. v. Mayor of Ring-
wood,11a the court adopted the RUTGERS REPORT114 as "the most
sophisticated and reliable methodology for determining the ex-
110. Id. at 65-67. In Flama Construction Corp. v. Township of Franklin, 201 N.J.
Super. 498, 493 A.2d 587 (1985), the court upheld an ordinance which required an appli-
cant to pay into an escrow fund sums to be expended for professional review of the
application as a prerequisite to any action by the planning board or board of adjustment.
The ordinance specified the amount to be posted based upon the size and type of devel-
opment. In rejecting assertions that the ordinance exerted an exclusionary effect on de-
velopment, the court concluded that "the ordinance neither creates a burdensome finan-
cial threshold nor lengthens the approval process ...." Id. at 506, 493 A.2d at 591-92.
111. AMG Realty, No. L-23277-80 PW, slip op. at 67 (N.J. Super. Ct. July 16, 1984).
112. Id. at 7-9.
113. Countryside Properties, Inc. v. Mayor of Ringwood, 205 N.J. Super. 291, 500
A.2d 767 (1984).
114. CENTER FOR URBAN POLICY RESEARCH, RUTGERS-THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW
JERSEY, MOUNT LAUREL II; CHALLENGE & DELIVERY OF Low-COST HOUSING (1983) [herein-
after cited as RUTGERS REPORT].
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tent of lower income persons occupying deficient housing.'' 5
The RUTGERS REPORT utilizes seven negative characteristics or
"surrogates" of housing surveyed in the 1980 census to identify
whether a housing unit should be considered as substandard:
whether the unit built prior to 1940, is occupied by more than
1.01 persons per room, permits access only by entering through
another dwelling, lacks plumbing facilities for the exclusive use of
occupants, lacks complete kitchen facilities, or lacks an elevator if
located in a more than four story structure." 6
Any dwelling unit constructed after 1940 is considered to be
substandard if two of the other six characteristics are present."7
Any unit constructed before 1940, however, is considered to be
substandard if one of the surrogates exists." 8 The court con-
cluded that the seven surrogate methodology employed by the
RUTGERS REPORT is more reliable than the three surrogate Ur-
ban League approach." 9
The source of the RUTGERS REPORT information on deficient
housing is a five percent sample of New Jersey households con-
ducted by the United States Census Bureau, the New Jersey
Public Use sample. Utilizing the computer correlation of the sur-
rogates, the number of deficient homes may be ascertained, as
well as the household size and the income levels of the families
occupying the units in order to establish what proportion of the
units are occupied by lower income families. 120 The Public Use
sample is not, however, generally available on the municipal
level.
In determining that the RUTGERS REPORT methodology is a
more reliable method of calculation of regional need, the court
observed that the "most serious weakness in the Urban League
methodology is its assumption that eighty-two percent of the
housing units designated as deficient are occupied by lower in-
115. Countryside Properties, 205 N.J. Super. at 300, 500 A.2d at 772.
116. Id. at 296, 500 A.2d at 770.
117. Id. at 300, 500 A.2d at 772; see also J.W. Field Co. v. Township of Franklin, 206
N.J. Super. 165, 170, 501 A.2d 1075, 1078 (1985).
118. Countryside Properties, 205 N.J. Super. at 305, 500 A.2d at 774; see also J.W.
Field Co., 206 N.J. Super. at 170, 501 A.2d at 1078.
119. Countryside Properties, 205 N.J. Super. at 304, 500 A.2d at 774.
120. Id. at 299, 500 A.2d at 771.
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come persons. "121 The court found that the Tri-State Regional
Planning Commission determination of eighty-two percent was
inaccurate with respect to New Jersey households occupying de-
ficient housing who are lower income persons in that: the study
included the entire New York metropolitan area, with New York
statistics consequently dominating the statistics, the primary
source of information was the 1970 census, and the term "inade-
quate housing" included units occupied by persons who pay a
disproportionate percentage of income for housing or commute
an excessive distance to work, characteristics not included in the
Urban League methodology as constituting part of present
need. 22
Judge Skillman determined that although the RUTGERS RE-
PORT is more reliable for determining the total number of sub-
standard dwelling units occupied by lower income persons, the
Urban League methodology is appropriate to convert the subre-
gion need to a municipal level. Accordingly, he adopted a meth-
odology which utilizes the Urban League methodology to deter-
mine the percentage of subregion present need in a particular
municipality. That figure is compared to the total present need
of the subregion arrived at by using the RUTGERS REPORT meth-
odology. By dividing the deficient municipal housing by the sub-
region deficiency, the percentage need of the subregional need
would be established. The municipality's fair share obligation
would be calculated by multiplying that resulting percentage by
the number of total subregional deficient units.121
In J.W. Field Co. v. Township of Franklin,24 Judge
Serpentelli continued "the process of development of a method
of fair share allocation,"'12 5 and modified somewhat the method-
ology previously adopted in AMG. This modification was made
in light of subsequent proof of the reliability of the methods
used in the RUTGERS REPORT and the criticism of the Tri-State
Planning Commission report of determination of the percentage
of substandard housing units occupied by lower income persons
121. Id. at 300, 500 A.2d at 772.
122. Id. at 301, 500 A.2d at 772.
123. Id. at 304, 500 A.2d at 774; see also J.W. Fields Co., 206 N.J. Super. at 172-73,
501 A.2d at 1079.
124. 206 N.J. Super. 165, 501 A.2d 1075 (1985).
125. Id. at 167, 501 A.2d at 1076.
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in Countryside Properties.
Judge Serpentelli concluded that the eighty-two percent
Tri-State estimate should be replaced by the determination of
lower income percentage of occupancy of deficient units ad-
vanced by the RUTGERS REPORT.1 1 6 If the three surrogates uti-
lized in AMG are income qualified through the use of the
RUTGERS REPORT computer tapes, the court's determination is
that 64.2% of the deficient units in the appropriate eleven
county region were occupied by lower income families. 2 ' The
decrease in this factor resulted in a smaller number of deficient
units in the region. 2 8 Because the pool of present need to be
reallocated is determined by the relationship of the regional per-
centage of deficient housing to regional housing stock, the court
required that the excess pool must be recalculated.' 9 The court
further determined that:
[T]he same reasons which justify the use of the percentage of de-
ficient units generated by the computer tapes on a regional basis
to produce the municipality's reallocated excess obligation, also
justify the use of the percentage on a subregional basis in order to
determine the indigenous responsibility of the municipality. 30
The court found, however, that the balance of the AMG
methodology is the correct approach to identifying and allocat-
ing the indigenous and excess present housing needs.' 3' In re-
jecting the remainder of the RUTGERS REPORT approach, Judge
Serpentelli cast doubt upon the validity of a number of the sur-
rogates utilized, particularly the use of the absence of an eleva-
tor to determine deficiency of housing, the lack of central heat-
ing, and the use of the year 1940 as a consideration of
dilapidation.132 He also found the RUTGERS REPORT approach to
be weak in its inability to generate housing numbers for individ-
ual municipalities by the use of the seven surrogates, in its in-
ability to disaggregate the subregion numbers, and in the fact
126. Id. at 172, 501 A.2d at 1079.
127. Id. at 174, 501 A.2d at 1080.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 173, 175, 501 A.2d at 1079, 1080.
132. Id. at 175, 501 A.2d at 1080.
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that significant delays in receipt of current information ex-
isted. 133 On the other hand, the court considered the AMG
methodology to be superior in that it: utilizes "three simple, di-
rect indicia of substandardness;" the three factors are "individu-
ally identifiable in an unduplicated manner in census data" and
"can be independently identified for each municipality;" and the
three are "clearly reflective of substandardness. 134 Additionally,
the court noted that "[t]he use of the heating deficiency factor
in AMG is more in keeping with a reasonable definition of ade-
quate heating inasmuch as many building codes permit heating
through the use of a flue even if central heating units are not
utilized."'n
G. Builder's Remedies and Municipal Compliance
Although the aim of the court in utilizing the SDGP was to
channel development into "growth" areas, in Orgo Farms &
Greenhouses, Inc. v. Township of Colts Neck, 3 ' the court deter-
mined that the location of a developer's property in an area des-
ignated as "limited growth" by the SDGP does not preclude the
granting of a builder's remedy as a matter of law with respect to
the property. The Township had asserted that the granting of a
builder's remedy in a limited growth area would violate the pat-
tern of orderly development envisioned by the New Jersey Su-
preme Court in basing Mount Laurel planning on the SDGP.
Judge Serpentelli, however, found nothing in the SDGP or
Mount Laurel H to sustain the Township's position because the
"concept maps of the SDGP, by admission of the authors, 'con-
sist of broad, generalized areas without site specific detail or pre-
cise boundaries .... , ,,137
Among the various rationales advanced by the court in sup-
port of its holding is one of strict practicality, that is, the nega-
tive impact on the goals of the Mount Laurel decision that
would result from a contrary decision.138 The court noted that
133. Id. at 175-76, 501 A.2d at 1081.
134. Id. at 176, 501 A.2d at 1081.
135. Id.
136. Orgo Farms & Greenhouses, Inc. v. Township of Colts Neck, 192 N.J. Super.
599, 471 A.2d 812 (1983).
137. Id. at 604, 471 A.2d at 814 (quoting SDGP at ii-iii).
138. Id. at 606-07, 471 A.2d at 814. The court offered four reasons for its conclusion:
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since less than fifty percent of the land in New Jersey is classi-
fied as growth, it was imperative to preserve all appropriate sites
for potential development.139 Moreover, the court found that be-
cause the purpose of the SDGP was to control growth, not elimi-
nate it, it was not contemplated that limited growth areas would
never accommodate growth under any circumstances.4 0
Judge Serpentelli also found that a contrary decision would
be destructive of the mandate that all communities, even those
located entirely within limited growth areas, make provisions for
their indigenous poor.1 41 Were denial of a builder's remedy to be
based solely on the SDGP classification, as opposed to the envi-
ronmental and planning considerations of the third prong of the
entitlement analysis, all incentives to provide adequate housing
in such areas would be abandoned. 142 "The paradox created is
that those least economically able to move would be required to
do just that, because the only decent, affordable housing to be
built would be in a growth area. "143
An additional basis articulated by the court for its decision
is the absence of any reference to the SDGP classification in
Mount Laurel H's discussion of entitlement. First, the Mount
Laurel H court's carefully worded discussion of the elements re-
quired as a prerequisite to the award of a builder's remedy did
not refer to the SDGP designations.14 4 Second, the Mount Lau-
rel H court applied those elements to four of the six cases de-
cided without using the SDGP. 45 Finally, the Mount Laurel H
1. The spirit of the opinion calls for this result.
2. The impact that a contrary result would have on the Mount Laurel goals is en-
tirely inconsistent with those goals.
3. The court's discussion of the builder's remedy makes no reference to the SDGP
classification.
4. Caputo v. Chester, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983) (Mount Laurel H, 92 N.J. at
309, 456 A.2d at 468) suggests the possibility that a remedy is available in a limited
growth area. Orgo Farms & Greenhouses, 192 N.J. at 605, 471 A.2d at 814.
139. Orgo Farms & Greenhouses, 192 N.J. Super. at 606, 471 A.2d at 815.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 606-07, 471 A.2d at 815.
144. Id. at 607, 471 A.2d at 815.
145. Id. at 607, 471 A.2d at 815-16. The four cases referred to are: Southern Burling-
ton County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel; Caputo v. Township of Chester;
Glenview Dev. Co. v. Township of Franklin; and Round Valley, Inc. v. Township of Clin-
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court meticulously detailed the limits it would impose on the
granting of a builder's remedy. "[H]ad the court intended to re-
strict the remedy to growth areas, it would have done so at this
point."146
To assure that the decision would not result in bad land
use, Judge Serpentelli stated that when a trial court is faced
with a demand for a builder's remedy for property located in a
limited growth area, substantial weight should, nonetheless, be
accorded the SDGP classification as it relates to the environ-
mental and planning concerns of the third prong of the entitle-
ment test.147 Moreover, the court suggested that it may be ap-
propriate in such situations to reverse the standard burden of
proof to require the builder to prove the absence of detrimental
environmental and planning effects in order to receive a
builder's remedy.148 While declining to specifically make such a
ruling at that time, the court found that a developer seeking a
builder's remedy in a limited growth area should be required to
participate to a greater extent in assisting the court in its deter-
mination of the environmental and planning issues.'4 9
The effectiveness of the Mount Laurel doctrine depends
upon voluntary compliance by municipalities, and the invocation
of remedies to assure compliance by recalcitrant communities. It
was clearly the aspiration of Mount Laurel II to stimulate vol-
untary compliance with its principles, and to encourage settle-
ment of Mount Laurel litigation. A municipality will, however,
be hesitant to rezone and take affirmative action unless the trial
court ratifies the settlement in a judgment of compliance bind-
ing third parties, thereby providing a six year period of repose
from Mount Laurel litigation. In the absence of such immunity,
settling communities would be subject to continuing interference
with the zoning process by virtue of subsequent developer claims
seeking builder's remedies. In Morris County Fair Housing
Council v. Boonton Township,50 Judge Skillman established the
ton. These cases are among those consolidated at 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1981).
146. Orgo Farms & Greenhouses, 192 N.J. Super. at 607, 471 A.2d at 816.
147. Id. at 611, 471 A.2d at 818.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Morris County Fair Housing Council v. Boonton Township, 197 N.J. Super.
359, 484 A.2d 1302 (1984).
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procedure whereby such proposed settlements may be reviewed
by the court.
Although Mount Laurel II did not specifically state that a
judgment of compliance was intended to be binding on non-par-
ties, the court did provide that upon the issuance of a judgment
of compliance, a community would be "free of litigious interfer-
ence with the normal planning process." 5 ' Such insulation from
litigation is, the court concluded, possible only if a judgment of
compliance is binding on non-parties.15 2 The court classified
Mount Laurel litigation as being similar to other representative
actions which are binding on non-parties.1 53 Because a litigant in
a Mount Laurel action is granted standing as a representative of
lower income persons whose constitutional rights have been vio-
lated, and not in an individual capacity, a judgment should be
binding upon non-party lower income persons and on other
developers. 154
Although the entry of a judgment of compliance will enable
a municipality to engage in long term planning and to construct
the necessary infrastructure, the court must ensure that the set-
tlement is in the best interests of those persons whose rights are
sought to be protected - lower income individuals. The court
observed that the risk of an inappropriate settlement is in-
creased when the action is brought by a developer and not a
public interest group since the developer and the municipality
have a common interest which may not further the objectives of
Mount Laurel. The municipality may seek to have a low fair
share allocated to it, while a developer may be only interested in
the approval of his project. Accordingly, the court determined
that notice of a proposed settlement, its terms, and an opportu-
nity to be heard in opposition thereto must be provided to the
public, public interest organizations, and property owners who
desire to construct lower income housing.1 55 If the court deter-
151. Id. at 364, 484 A.2d at 1305 (quoting Mount Laurel 11, 92 N.J. at 292, 456 A.2d
at 459).
152. Morris County Fair Housing Council, 197 N.J. Super. at 364, 484 A.2d at 1305.
153. Id. at 364-65, 484 A.2d at 1305. The court considered Mount Laurel litigation
akin to class actions, suits by public officials or agencies which are authorized by law to
represent the public or a class of citizens, and taxpayers' actions.
154. Id. at 366, 484 A.2d at 1306.
155. Id. at 371, 484 A.2d at 1308.
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mines that a presentation in opposition to the settlement is in-
adequate to determine whether the settlement is fair and rea-
sonable, it may appoint a master to make recommendations to
the court.' 56 "In fact, a master probably should be appointed as
a matter of course in any case where a developer is the only
party representing lower income persons." '' 57
The court rejected the argument that the municipality's
precise "fair share number must be determined as a prerequisite
to the entry of a judgment of compliance because fair share de-
terminations are the most time consuming and difficult part of
Mount Laurel II litigation. ' " 8 The court, therefore, held that to
require such a determination would be inconsistent with the
purposes of settlement of Mount Laurel litigation, that is, to
save litigation expense, to preserve judicial resources, and to fa-
cilitate the early construction of lower income housing rather
than interminable litigation.'"
Having determined that a municipality's ordinance violates
the mandates of Mount Laurel II, in what priority does the
court award builder's remedies among several plaintiffs whose
offers to build low and moderate income housing exceeds the
municipality's fair share requirement? In J. W. Field Co. v.
Township of Franklin'60 (Field II) Judge Serpentelli enunciated
seven policy objectives which must be evaluated to devise a pri-
ority system of the award of a builder's remedy. The importance
of the first consideration - to encourage builders to institute
Mount Laurel litigation - is emphasized by the finding that
every Mount Laurel action since the Mount Laurel II decision
has been brought by a builder, rather than a non-profit group or
public agency.' 6 ' The granting of a builder's remedy is the eco-
nomic inducement to stimulate developer enforcement of the
Mount Laurel obligation.1 62 It is granted as a matter of course if
the builder demonstrates noncompliance of a zoning law, pro-
156. Id. at 371, 484 A.2d at 1308-09.
157. Id. at 371 n.2, 484 A.2d at 1309 n.2.
158. Id. at 371, 484 A.2d at 1309.
159. Id. at 372, 484 A.2d at 1309.
160. J.W. Field Co. v. Township of Franklin, 204 N.J. Super. 445, 499 A.2d 251
(Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985).
161. Id. at 452, 499 A.2d at 254-55.
162. Id. at 452, 499 A.2d at 254.
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poses to construct a substantial amount of lower income hous-
ing, and the construction can be implemented without substan-
tial negative environmental or planning impact.' 3 Second, a
"bright line" standard is necessary to avoid confusion, expense
and delay because, in the opinion of the court, a builder is less
likely to sue if he cannot assess the chances of being awarded a
builder's remedy with a reasonable certainty. 6' Third, the
award of a builder's remedy must maximize the opportunity for
lower income housing while minimizing the impact on the envi-
ronment.1 5 Accordingly, an award of a builder's remedy may be
softened by court authorization to phase-in development over a
number of years to avoid radical transformation of the
community. 166
Recognizing that the mandate of Mount Laurel is to pro-
vide housing, not litigation, the court, as a fourth consideration,
requires that any priority system will discourage litigation and
preserve municipal planning flexibility. 6 7 Although multiple
plaintiffs are generally necessary to ensure prosecution of Mount
Laurel principles, "[e]xperience has also demonstrated ... that
there is a limit to the number of plaintiffs needed to vindicate
the constitutional obligation and that excessive plaintiffs can
emasculate the municipal planning options."16 8 Fairness and effi-
ciency require the consolidation of all timely filed Mount Laurel
claims against a particular municipality.6 9 Such consolidation,
however, undermines the intent of Mount Laurel II by making
such litigation infinitely more complex and lengthy, and by po-
tentially exposing the municipality to the award of multiple
builder's remedies, depriving it of planning flexibility and de-
creasing the likelihood of dispute settlement. 7 0 Fifth, although
the SDGP designation should not, as a matter of law, be a deter-
minant of the right to a builder's remedy, it must be a factor in
determining the priority among the plaintiffs seeking the award
163. Id. at 451-52, 499 A.2d at 254.
164. Id. at 453, 499 A.2d at 255.
165. Id. (citing Mount Laurel 11, 92 N.J. at 280, 331-32, 456 A.2d at 452-53, 479-80).
166. J. W. Field Co., 204 N.J. Super. at 453, 499 A.2d at 255.
167. Id. at 454, 499 A.2d at 255.
168. Id. at 454, 499 A.2d at 256.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 454-55, 499 A.2d at 256.
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of a builder's remedy.17 1
One of the prime considerations of the Mount Laurel H de-
cision was encouragement of voluntary compliance with the con-
stitutional obligations enunciated therein.'72 Similarly, early set-
tlement of Mount Laurel litigation benefits all parties. The
avoidance of builder suits and their early settlement enables the
municipality to preserve its planning flexibility in response to
Mount Laurel requirements. For example, where a municipality
concedes noncompliance and obtains the court's sanction of its
proposed fair share number, Judge Serpentelli has permitted
municipal litigants a ninety day period of immunity from the
filing of builder's remedy actions in order to facilitate the formu-
lation of their planning response.17 3 Such a procedure is permit-
ted once litigation has been commenced or in an action brought
by the municipality seeking declaratory relief. 7 4
The development of fair share methodologies has increased
the impetus for voluntary settlement of disputes because
"[m]ost of the reasonable methodologies, to date, have produced
fair share numbers within a relatively close range.'17 5 Moreover,
the court held that it will not insist on rigid adherence to its fair
share methodology when confronted with voluntary efforts at
compliance. 7 6 In order to provide an incentive for the prompt
settlement of Mount Laurel litigation, the Serpentelli court will
permit flexibility in settlement methods. 77 Accordingly, munici-
palities that voluntarily undertake to comply with Mount Laurel
may be entitled to a number of judicial concessions: flexibility in
determining fair share numbers, temporary immunity from
builder's remedy litigation, and the phasing-in of its fair share
requirement beyond 1990.178 The use of such devices, in the
opinion of the court, provides the greatest latitude to communi-
ties in planning their method of compliance with Mount Laurel,
and can remove or substantially ameliorate the overbuilding
171. Id. at 455, 499 A.2d at 256.
172. Mount Laurel 11, 92 N.J. at 214, 456 A.2d at 418.
173. J. W. Field Co., 204 N.J. Super. at 456, 499 A.2d at 257.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 456-57, 499 A.2d at 257.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 458, 499 A.2d at 258.
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which results from the satisfaction of a municipality's responsi-
bility by utilization of twenty percent mandatory set-asides.179
Alternate methods of compliance are authorized if a municipal-
ity seeks to voluntarily comply, but such flexibility is lost if, as a
result of litigation, a community's fair share must be satisfied by
the use of builder's remedies.180 A municipality can avoid being
placed in the uncomfortable position where the court must pri-
oritize builder's remedies: "[ilts choice is to seize the initiative
through voluntary compliance, early settlement and compliance
mechanisms such as phasing or wait to be sued and possibly
subject itself to a court imposed priority arrangement.' 81
The seventh policy consideration, actual construction, fa-
vors the involvement of multiple plaintiffs in Mount Laurel liti-
gation, resulting in greater assurance that Mount Laurel con-
struction will take place. Absent such impetus, the mere
rezoning of property to comply with a municipality's Mount
Laurel obligation will not ensure actual construction. Because
the mere revision of a zoning ordinance does not ensure that ac-
tual Mount Laurel construction will occur, the seventh policy
consideration is the promotion of actual construction. Since in-
tangibles such as the predilections of property owners, political
pressures not to sell property, and property price inflation as the
result of rezoning and other factors, may result in an uncertain
future for such rezoned land, the involvement of multiple plain-
tiffs in Mount Laurel litigation results in greater assurance that
Mount Laurel construction will take place.18 2
Utilizing the above policy considerations, Judge Serpentelli
devised a four-step system of priorities in the awarding of
builder's remedies when multiple builder-plaintiffs have partici-
pated in Mount Laurel litigation. Initially, a builder must meet
the threshold test of entitlement in order to participate in the
prioritization process. 83 Accordingly, a builder-plaintiff who
does not participate in that portion of a Mount Laurel trial in
which noncompliance is proved, is not entitled to a builder's
179. Id.
180. Id. at 459, 499 A.2d at 258.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 459-60, 499 A.2d at 258-59.
183. See Mount Laurel 1I, 92 N.J. at 279-80, 456 A.2d at 452, see also J. W. Field
Co., 204 N.J. Super. at 460, 499 A.2d at 259.
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remedy. 184 Second, the first builder who files a complaint and
establishes entitlement is awarded the first remedy only if the
property is located significantly within the growth area. 185
Third, plaintiffs establishing entitlement shall be awarded
builder's remedies based upon the date of the filing of the action
if the property is located significantly within a growth area. That
order, however, may be varied by the court based upon consider-
ation of whether any project is clearly more likely to result in
actual construction, and whether any project is clearly more
suitable from a planning perspective. 88 Modification of the es-
tablished priorities as a result of the potential for construction
or site suitability is appropriate only if reasonable persons could
not disagree that the order should be adjusted. 87 Lastly, if the
award of additional builder's remedies is required to satisfy the
community's fair share obligation, parcels in limited growth ar-
eas which have satisfied the threshold test of entitlement shall
be considered in the same manner as step three above.'88 Be-
cause environmental and planning constraints are more impera-
tive in limited growth areas, the third prong of the entitlement
test may often preclude the use of limited growth parcels. 89
Utilization of such parcels constitutes a recognition that the
SDGP designation of land is not necessarily sufficient to justify
the denial of a builder's remedy.
The court rejected the arguments of the plaintiffs that all
builders who have established entitlement should receive a
builder's remedy even if the municipality's fair share has been
exceeded. The "priority arrangement adopted here assumes that
no municipality shall be called upon to absorb more than the
fair share emanating from the methodology the supreme court
utilizes."' 90 The exposure to multiple builder's remedies, how-
184. J. W. Field Co., 204 N.J. Super. at 460-61, 499 A.2d 259. A plaintiff joined only
for the purposes of participating in a court ordered revision of a noncomplaint ordinance
would not participate in that portion of the trial in which noncompliance is demon-
strated. Id. at 461, 499 A.2d at 259. A plaintiff in such a partially consolidated trial will
not be entitled to participate in the prioritization process. Id. at 460, 499 A.2d at 259.
185. Id. at 460, 499 A.2d at 259.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 462, 464, 499 A.2d at 260, 261.
188. Id. at 460, 464-65, 499 A.2d at 259, 261.
189. Id. at 465, 499 A.2d at 261.
190. Id. at 466, 499 A.2d at 262.
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ever, will encourage voluntary municipal compliance with Mount
Laurel II.
In Orgo Farms & Greenhouses, Inc. v. Township of Colts
Neck,191 (Orgo Farms II) the court addressed the third prong of
the entitlement analysis, the suitability of development. Ini-
tially, Judge Serpentelli rejected an attack on the continued via-
bility of the SDGP "limited growth" designation of the land in
question. Although the supreme court in Mount Laurel II pre-
mised the continued viability of the SDGP designations upon its
belief that the plan should be revised no later than January 1,
1985,192 in the absence of evidence demonstrating a significant
modification in land use development patterns in the municipal-
ity since the promulgation of the SDGP, the court continued to
utilize its designations. "The fact that January 1, 1985 has come
and gone without the preparation of a new SDGP should not
cause the court to throw planning to the wind by allowing this
predominantly undeveloped community to experience large scale
development in the middle of an essentially rural farm area. '"193
The rationale for the Mount Laurel H decision, "one of the fore-
most judicial statements of concern for the protection of the en-
vironment and the preservation of natural resources. .. did not
evaporate on January 1, 1985."'"
Finding that Mount Laurel should not encourage inefficient
use of resources, 95 the court determined that the proposed pro-
ject at the subject parcel was contrary to sound land use plan-
ning and failed to satisfy the third prong of the entitlement test.
The developer was not, therefore, entitled to a builder's remedy.
The parcel, located in the center of a large limited growth
area, 9 6 was distant from waterlines and other infrastructure, 197
and the proposed one thousand dwelling unit development, ho-
tel, and commercial area would negatively impact the adjacent
191. Orgo Farms & Greenhouse, Inc. v. Township of Colts Neck, 204 N.J. Super.
585, 499 A.2d 565 (1985).
192. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 242, 456 A.2d at 432-33.
193. Orgo Farms & Greenhouse, 204 N.J. Super. at 589-90, 499 A.2d at 567.
194. Id. at 590, 499 A.2d at 567.
195. Id. at 592, 499 A.2d at 568.
196. Id. at 589, 592, 499 A.2d at 566, 568.
197. Id. at 590-91, 499 A.2d at 567. In order to connect the property to the public
water system, 3.7 miles of waterline was required to be installed. Id.
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farm uses.' 9
The court rejected Orgo's equity arguments that it is enti-
tled to a builder's remedy because it had diligently pursued the
litigation for seven years, finding that any sophisticated land de-
veloper realizes that zoning litigation is a "risky business."199
Orgo also asserted that the SDGP designation should not affect
its rights because the SDGP was not part of the Mount Laurel
doctrine when the action was commenced, and because the
SDGP was not revised. The court, however, determined that
limited growth classification of the land alone was not the basis
for the finding that the property was unsuitable. The facts, how-
ever, which formed the basis for the classification remained con-
stant even if the classification itself was not to be given the same
legal weight. 00
Lastly, the court found that the issue of whether another
competing site would be developed was irrelevant at this stage
- "comparative suitability of the two tracts is not the issue. ' '120
The question was solely whether either or both of the tracts
were suitable for Mount Laurel construction. Not until the com-
pliance stage would the court examine in depth whether the
other parcel presents a realistic opportunity for the construction
of lower income housing within the time to be required by the
court . o
H. Compliance Analysis
In Allan-Deane Corp. v. Township of Bedminster,'"° the is-
sue presented to the court was whether the Township had
adopted a compliance ordinance that provided a realistic oppor-
tunity for the actual construction of its fair share of low and
moderate income housing, and whether it had satisfied any
builder's remedies which might have been earned. Although all
198. Id. The court found that "no amount of innovative planning, buffering or other
devices can take away the potential for the disruption of the existing land use pattern in
that area." Id. at 591, 499 A.2d at 567-68.
199. Id. at 593, 499 A.2d at 568.
200. Id. at 593, 499 A.2d at 569.
201. Id. at 594, 499 A.2d at 569.
202. Id. at 593-94, 499 A.2d at 569.
203. Allan-Deane Corp. v. Township of Bedminster, 205 N.J. Super. 87, 500 A.2d 49
(1985).
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of the parties agreed that the Township's fair share was 819
units pursuant to the AMG methodology, the Township sought
either to have the number reduced as a result of its voluntary
compliance with Mount Laurel II, or court authorization to
phase-in the units by requiring that only 656 units be con-
structed by the end of the decade with the remainder to be built
thereafter.
It has been the policy of the Serpentelli court to permit
modifications of the fair share number produced by the AMG
methodology when a municipality has stipulated noncompliance
and fair share at an early stage of the litigation, or has sought
declaratory relief before litigation was instituted against it, and
has in either case agreed to comply within a specified period of
time.20 " The court noted that similar adjustments in the fair
share number may be made in cases in which equity dictates
such an approach.20 5 Among the justifications noted by the court
for such flexibility is the fact that the AMG methodology is not
scientifically precise, and merely represents the initial evolution-
ary stage of the development of a fair share methodology.08 Sec-
ond, flexibility in determining a municipality's fair share consti-
tutes an incentive for voluntary compliance.2 7 Third, to the
extent that the court's flexibility stimulates voluntary compli-
ance, one of the key considerations of Mount Laurel will be sat-
isfied - more housing will be constructed in a shorter period of
time.208
The court determined that the circumstances which author-
ize fair share flexibility did not exist in the Allan-Deane case
because the settlement did not occur until more than one year
after the matter was remanded for proceedings in accordance
with the Mount Laurel H decision, more than eighteen months
after the Mount Laurel II decision, and not until settlement was
directed within thirty days or a trial would be held concerning
the awarding of builder's remedies. 0 9
All parties to the controversy agreed that the court had the
204. Id. at 106, 500 A.2d at 58.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 106-07, 500 A.2d at 58.
209. Id. at 107, 500 A.2d at 59.
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authority to cushion the impact of Mount Laurel development
on a municipality where the impact would cause "sudden and
radical transformation[s]. 1 0 Numbers alone, however, cannot
justify a finding of radical transformation." Fair share compli-
ance programs which use the generally accepted mandatory set-
aside of four market units to one lower income unit, for example,
will necessarily produce high growth percentages. 2 Moreover,
absent specific information concerning the actual impact on a
community, growth rate comparisons have limited value. That
does not mean to say that the court considers such statistics to
be worthless - they provide some general guidance to the court
in assessing projected growth rates. 1 3
The authority to phase-in development as the result of radi-
cal transformation of a community is only to be exercised spar-
ingly so as not to dilute the Mount Laurel obligation. 214 Al-
though Mount Laurel H does not define radical transformation,
the court viewed the term in its common sense connotation, that
is, "a rapid and extreme change in existing conditions."21 5 In
measuring the capacity of a municipality to absorb such change
in a specified period of time, the court must examine the extent
of required capital improvements, institutional and service de-
mands, and unique environmental and planning concerns which
might render a community particularly sensitive to sudden
growth.21 6 The court rejected arguments that a municipality is
precluded from raising a defense of radical transformation as a
consequence of past failures to accommodate growth.2 17 The
court additionally rejected the argument that radical transfor-
mation had been intensified by Bedminster's choice of its means
of compliance by the construction of four market units for each
unit of lower income housing.2 8
210. Id. (quoting Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 280, 456 A.2d at 452-53).
211. Allan-Deane Corp., 205 N.J. Super. at 109, 500 A.2d at 60.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 109-10, 500 A.2d at 60.
214. Id. at 110, 500 A.2d at 60 (citing Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. 158, 219, 456 A.2d
390, 420).
215. Allan-Deane Corp., 205 N.J. Super. at 111, 500 A.2d at 61.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 110, 500 A.2d at 60.
218. Id. at 110-11, 500 A.2d at 60. Although the court held that the argument "does
not carry the day at this point . . . it may have considerable weight in the future as
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Noting that the infrastructure of the Township is extremely
limited, its school system compatible with its small size and its
municipal service structure very limited, the court concluded
that its rural character had not changed significantly in many
years and that the fulfillment of its full fair share in this decade
would work a radical transformation in the Township.21 9 Accord-
ingly, the court determined that the Township was required to
provide 656 of the units on or before December 31, 1990, with
the remaining 163 units to be provided by December 31, 1994.220
To determine whether an ordinance complies with the
Mount Laurel H mandate that a municipality must provide a
realistic opportunity for the construction of its fair share of low
income housing, the court devised a three step review to deter-
mine if such "likelihood" has been achieved.221 Initially, it must
be determined whether the municipality's ordinances are free
from all excessive restrictions and exactions or other cost gener-
ating devices that are not necessary to protect health and
safety.2 22 Second, the court must examine the sites selected or
other mechanisms used to achieve compliance to ascertain the
likelihood of actual construction within the compliance pe-
riod.223 Such review may involve evaluation of site suitability, 224
affirmative measures to encourage low cost housing,225 alterna-
tive compliance mechanisms,2 26 project feasibility,227 and any in-
acceptable and realistic alternative modes of compliance are developed." Id. at 111, 500
A.2d at 61.
219. Id. at 112, 500 A.2d at 61.
220. Id. The court emphasized that the 163 unit deferred portion of the 1980-1990
obligation is in addition to any fair share obligation which the Township is determined
to have for the 1990-2000 decade. Id.
221. Id. at 113, 500 A.2d at 62.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. A review of site suitability relates to the physical appropriateness of the prop-
erty. Among the relevant factors in such inquiry are: environmental suitability, availabil-
ity of infrastructure, proximity to goods and services, regional accessibility and compati-
bility with neighboring land uses. Id. at 115, 500 A.2d at 63.
225. A review of affirmative measures includes examination of subsidies, inclusion-
ary zoning devices, incentive zoning, mandatory set-asides and resale controls necessary
to ensure that lower income units will remain affordable. Id.
226. Alternate compliance mechanisms are those by which a municipality may avoid
20"(" mandatory set-aside construction of four market units for each lower income unit,
such as commercial incentive zoning which includes lower income housing or projects
funded by the municipality. Id.
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tangibles which may affect the likelihood of development. The
mere revision of a zoning ordinance to provide for Mount Laurel
housing does not guarantee that such housing will actually be
constructed. The court must, accordingly, ascertain whether
there are any hidden factors in the compliance package which
would impair the likelihood of development. Such factors in-
clude: individual predilections of property owners, political pres-
sures not to sell, title problems, vested approvals for other uses
and the inflation of market prices as a result of Mount Laurel
rezoning.2 2 Lastly, if the sites selected or other mechanisms uti-
lized are realistic, then the court will approve the compliance
package." 9
The court affirmed that it is not its function to substitute
its judgment for that of a municipality, absent entitlement to a
builder's remedy, when a reasonable compliance package is of-
fered by a municipality, although a number of equally reasona-
ble alternatives are presented. 3 0 Accordingly, in its examination
of a proposed compliance package, the court will not review
other sites or mechanisms which may be asserted to be more
likely to produce Mount Laurel construction. In the opinion of
the court, the owner of property excluded from a community's
compliance package has not been treated unfairly because
"Mount Laurel principles exist for the benefit of the lower in-
come households of our state [New Jersey], not for those seeking
rezoning.
''231
In addition to the requirement that each site must be realis-
tic, the court emphasized that the total package must demon-
227. Project feasibility relates to whether the rezoning and other affirmative mea-
sures will result in sufficient profit to make a project a likelihood. The court will review
any density bonuses granted as the result of mandatory set-asides to ascertain whether
sufficient funds will be generated to provide internal subsidies for the lower income
units. Construction will not occur if the set-asides are too high or the bonus too low. The
court must also review fee waivers, tax abatements and other municipal actions designed
to provide a builder with the assurance of a reasonable profit. Id. at 115-16, 500 A.2d at
63.
228. Id. at 116, 500 A.2d at 63.
229. Id. at 116-17, 500 A.2d at 63-64.
230. "[A] municipality is not required to replace its reasonable approach with an-
other reasonable approach merely because a property owner or owners, not entitled to a
builder's remedy are excluded from the package or because it might have been just as
reasonable to include them." Id. at 132, 500 A.2d at 72.
231. Id. at 114, 500 A.2d at 62.
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strate reasonable planning. The fact that each site is realistic
does not compel the conclusion that the combination will auto-
matically produce an acceptable compliance package. As an ex-
ample, the court must ascertain that social segregation will not
result within individual projects or the community. 232
The court concluded that the subject ordinance eliminated
all unnecessary cost generating devices, provided sufficient af-
firmative measures,23 3 and created zoning for sites which were
likely to satisfy the Township's Mount Laurel obligation in a
timely manner.234 The court rejected the claims of a competing
property owner, Dobbs, that his property, excluded from the
compliance package, was more appropriate to provide Mount
Laurel housing and should, therefore, be substituted for other
included parcels. The court also rejected his claim of entitlement
to a builder's remedy since he did not intervene in the action
until after the ordinance had been found to be noncompliant.
Accordingly, he failed to satisfy the entitlement standard for two
reasons: he was not a Mount Laurel plaintiff, and he did not
cause the process leading to the acceptance of a compliance
ordinance.2 35
In rejecting arguments that additional overzoning was re-
quired, in order to guarantee that the initial phase of the Town-
ship's fair share would be satisfied, the court noted that overzon-
ing is not mandated in all cases and should, if required, be
directly related to the likelihood of construction of compliance
sites.236 Given the "greater assurance of compliance than is
available in the typical case," the court declined to require ex-
cessive overzoning in the initial phase which might serve to gen-
erate unnecessary growth.23 7 The court also refused to order
"substantial overzoning" for the deferred obligation at the time
of the decision, preferring to assess the need therefor at the time
232. Id. at 116-17, 500 A.2d at 63-64.
233. The affirmative measures utilized by Bedminster included: waiver of certain
application fees; adoption of a resolution of need; ratification of a tax abatement agree-
ment; assistance to developer in obtaining financing; contributions to defray administra-
tive expenses of nonprofit corporations to maintain the price structure of lower income
units and upgrading of sewer facilities. Id. at 117-18, 500 A.2d at 64.
234. Id. at 136, 500 A.2d at 74.
235. Id. at 138, 500 A.2d at 75.
236. Id. at 144, 500 A.2d at 78.
237. Id.
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of the calculation of the 1990-2000 fair share.2 38
Lastly, Dobbs asserted that a portion of the Mount Laurel
units under construction did not satisfy the affordability criteria
of Mount Laurel I. The court found that the units could be
purchased by lower income families who would not be required
to utilize more than twenty-eight percent of their gross income
for payments of principal, interest, taxes, insurance and condo-
minium fees, the standard widely accepted in Mount Laurel
litigation. 39
I. Fair Housing Act
Responding to Mount Laurel II's invitation for legislative
action2 40 and to the unpopular reaction to Mount Laurel II, the
New Jersey Legislature approved the Fair Housing Act 41 in
1985 providing an administrative mechanism for assuring com-
pliance with the constitutional mandates of Mount Laurel II.
The measure indicated the Legislature's preference for the reso-
lution of Mount Laurel claims by means of mediation, not litiga-
tion.242 The legislation reflects a desire to provide low and mod-
erate cost housing in accordance with sound planning concepts
and regional need.243
The Act provides for the creation of the Council on Afforda-
ble Housing244 whose duties include: the determination of hous-
ing regions, estimation of present and prospective need for low
and moderate income housing, and the adoption of guidelines so
that municipalities may determine their present and prospective
fair share of the housing need for its region.24 1 The Council's
mandate is the "administration of housing obligations in accor-
dance with sound regional planning considerations .... ",248 A
238. Id. at 145, 500 A.2d at 79.
239. Id. at 146, 500 A.2d at 79.
240. Mount Laurel 11, 92 N.J. at 212-14, 456 A.2d at 417.
241. 1985 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 222 (West).
242. Id. at § 3.
243. Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Fair
Housing Act in The Hills Development Co. v. Township of Bernards, No. A-122-85 (N.J.
Sup. Ct. Feb. 20, 1986).
244. 1985 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 222 (West) at § 5.
245. Id. at § 7.
246. Id. at § 4(a).
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community may elect to submit a "housing element" plan to the
Council which must be designed to "meet present and prospec-
tive housing needs, with particular attention to low and moder-
ate income housing .... "247 A municipality may utilize any tech-
nique in the preparation of its housing element which provides a
realistic opportunity for the provision of its fair share, including:
rezoning to provide economic viability of a development by pro-
viding sufficient densities through mandatory set-asides or den-
sity bonuses, tax abatements, infrastructure expansion and reha-
bilitation, and the utilization of municipality-generated funds.
24 8
A municipality may petition the Council for substantive certifi-
cation of its housing element, or commence a declaratory judg-
ment action within six years after the submission of its housing
element.2 9 If no objection is filed with the Council within forty-
five days after notice of the submission, the Council must issue
substantial certification, and the municipality is permitted forty-
five days within which to adopt its fair share housing ordi-
nance. 250 If an objection is filed to a petition for housing certifi-
cation, the Council is required to mediate the dispute. If the me-
diation is unsuccessful, a factual hearing is required to be held
before an administrative law judge.2 5
Any Mount Laurel litigation instituted less than sixty days
before the effective date of the Act or thereafter must utilize its
administrative provisions if the defendant-municipality so
elects. Any exclusionary zoning cases instituted more than sixty
days before the Act's effective date may, at the discretion of the
trial court, be transferred to the Council. In determining such
application, the court is required to consider whether a transfer
of the action "would result in a manifest injustice to any party
to the litigation."252
In a sharp departure from the Mount Laurel II decision,
247. Id. at §§ 9-10.
248. Id. at § 11.
249. Id. at § 13.
250. Id. at § 14. Prior to issuance of a substantive certification, the Council must
find that the fair share plan is consistent with the Council's rules, is not inconsistent
with achievement of the low and moderate income housing need of the region, and that
the achievement of the municipality's fair share is realistically possible by virtue of the
elimination of cost generating regulations and affirmative measures. Id.
251. Id. at §§ 15(a)-(c).
252. Id. at § 16.
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the Act prohibits the award of a builder's remedy for all suits
filed after January 30, 1983.253 The legislation also authorizes
the phasing-in of a municiplity's fair share obligation with re-
spect to any municipality which has an action pending or a judg-
ment entered against it after the Act's effective date,254 or which
had a judgment entered against it prior to the effective date and
from which an appeal is pending, or which has instituted an ac-
tion for a declaratory judgment pursuant to the Act's
provisions. 55
The fair share ordinance of any municipality which has
been certified by the Council is considered to be presumptively
valid in any subsequent exclusionary zoning action filed against
the municipality and the party seeking to rebut that presump-
tion is required to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence
that the housing element and ordinances do not provide a realis-
tic opportunity for the provision of the municipality's fair
share.256
The Fair Housing Act varies a number of the definitions
formulated by the Mount Laurel trial judges which may signifi-
cantly affect a municipality's fair share number. A "housing re-
gion" is defined to be "a geographic area of no less than two nor
more than four contiguous, whole counties which exhibit signifi-
cant social, economic and income similarities, and which consti-
tute to the greatest extent practicable the primary metropolitan
statistical areas" of the Census Bureau.2 57 "Prospective need" is
considered to be "a projection of housing needs based on devel-
opment and growth which is reasonably likely to occur in a re-
gion or a municipality, as the case may be as a result of actual
determination of public and private entities."2 '8
253. Id. at § 28.
254. July 2, 1985. 1985 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 222 (West).
255. 1985 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 222 (West) at § 23(a).
256. Id. at § 17(a).
257. Id. at § 4(b).
258. Id. at § 4(j).
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III. New York
A. The Berenson Doctrine
New York courts have maintained a far more conservative
perspective of the issue of exclusionary zoning. 59 In Berenson v.
Town of New Castle, s0 the court of appeals enunciated a two
part test to examine the validity of an ordinance challenged as
exclusionary: First, whether the municipality has provided a
properly balanced and well ordered plan for the community.
Second, whether consideration was given to the present and fu-
ture housing requirements of the region.261 With respect to the
first portion of the analysis, the court observed that what may
be appropriate for one community may differ substantially from
what is appropriate for another. Recognizing that such differ-
ences exist between communities, the court stated that although
"it may be impermissible in an undeveloped community to pre-
vent entirely the construction of multiple-family residences any-
where in the locality ... it is perfectly acceptable to limit new
construction of such buildings where such units already exist.' "2
Accordingly, a trial court must ascertain what types of housing
exist in a municipality, their quantity and quality, whether the
supply satisfies the present needs of the community, whether
new construction is required to fulfill the future requirements of
the municipality, and, if so, the form of such new development.
Although zoning has traditionally been considered to affect
only land within the community, zoning activities have a sub-
stantial impact beyond the borders of the municipality. Accord-
ingly, in examining whether a community has considered re-
gional needs, "there must be a balancing of the local desire to
maintain the status quo within the community and the greater
public interest that regional needs be met."2 63 If the regional
and local need for such housing is met by the local community
259. See Nolon, Exclusionary Zoning: New York, New Jersey Cases Compared,
N.Y.L.J., July 2, 1985, at 1, col. 1 and N.Y.L.J., July 22, 1985, at 1, col. 1, for a compari-
son of the key points of the Mount Laurel decision and the Berenson-Blitz decisions.
260. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d' 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d
672 (1975).
261. Id. at 110, 341 N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 680-81.
262. Id. at 110, 341 N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 680.
263. Id. at 110, 341 N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 681.
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or by other accessible areas in the community at large, an ordi-
nance may not be held to be invalid on its face. The court ob-
served, however, that since zoning is essentially a legislative act:
[I]t is quite anomalous that a court should be required to perform
the tasks of a regional planner. To that end, we look to the Legis-
lature to make appropriate changes in order to foster the develop-
ment of programs designed to achieve sound regional planning.
While the people of New Castle may fervently desire to be left
alone by the forces of change, the ultimate determination is not
solely theirs. 64
In Robert E. Kurzius, Inc. v. Village of Upper Brookville, 2 65
the court of appeals found an ordinance which zoned certain ar-
eas of a village for a minimum lot area of five acres to be valid.
While emphasizing that it would not "countenance community
efforts at exclusion under any guise,"'2 6 large-lot zoning is, under
appropriate circumstances, a legitimate means to advance the
public welfare of preservation of open spaces and the protection
of the ill-effects of urbanization. The decision added an addi-
tional basis upon which a zoning ordinance could be found to be
invalid, that is, if it is enacted for an improper purpose. As a
result, "[o]nce an exclusionary effect coupled with a failure to
balance the local desires with housing needs has been proved,
then the burden of otherwise justifying the ordinance shifts to
the defendant. ' 267
In Blitz v. Town of New Castle,6 8 the second department
rejected the contention that zoning ordinances must affirma-
tively provide for the creation of all necessary housing and ob-
served that "New York courts have consistently rejected any
'fair share' doctrine which would impose specific unit goals or
quotas of housing on a municipality .... 29 Instead, the Blitz
court determined that it should examine certain "relevant data
which may indicate whether New Castle's provisions for housing
are at all commensurate with some general notion of its ex-
264. Id. at 111, 341 N.E.2d at 243, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 682.
265. Robert E. Kurzius, Inc. v. Village of Upper Brookville, 51 N.Y.2d 338, 414
N.E.2d 680, 434 N.Y.S.2d 180, cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042 (1980).
266. Id. at 344-45, 341 N.E.2d at 683, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 183.
267. Id. at 345, 341 N.E.2d at 683-84, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 183.
268. Blitz v. Town of New Castle, 94 A.D.2d 92, 463 N.Y.S.2d 832 (2d Dep't 1983).
269. Id. at 98, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 836.
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pected contribution to the regional housing need. ' 17 0 In calculat-
ing the housing needs of the region the court considered the re-
port of a blue ribbon committee which was adopted by the
county legislature as the county housing policy to be "the best
possible estimate of the housing needs of Westchester County
for the coming decade and that as a legislative finding it is enti-
tled to great weight and the presumption of validity. '271
The court rejected the plaintiff's contention that it is the
number of housing units that will actually or probably be built
that is determinative of whether the second portion of the Ber-
enson analysis has been satisfied and determined that the
proper focus of its inquiry is limited to whether the ordinance
allows the development of sufficient housing to satisfy any rea-
sonable estimate of the town's proportionate anticipated contri-
bution. The court reaffirmed the holding of Berenson that af-
firmative action is not required:
[Z]oning ordinances will go no further than determining what
may or may not be built; market forces will decide what will actu-
ally be built,... our concern is to determine whether, on its face,
the amended ordinance will allow the construction of sufficient
housing to meet the town's share of the region's housing needs,
particularly for multifamily housing, assuming that such con-
struction be both physically and economically feasible.2 72
The controversy remained fairly static in New York until
the law enunciated in the 1983 Mount Laurel II decision began
to be asserted in New York land use controversies. In Suffolk
Housing Services v. Town of Brookhaven,' 73 the second depart-
ment in 1985 declined to "work a change of historic proportions
in the development of New York zoning law, 2 74 and determined
that the Mount Laurel decisions' requirement of a constitutional
obligation on the part of municipalities to zone for low and mod-
erate income housing is inapplicable in New York. The plaintiffs
alleged that the town, through its zoning ordinance, policies and
270. Id.
271. Id. at 98, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 835.
272. Id. at 99, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 836.
273. Suffolk Housing Services v. Town of Brookhaven, 109 A.D.2d 323, 491 N.Y.S.2d
396 (2d Dep't 1985).
274. Id. at 332, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
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practices, had prevented the development of sufficient housing
to accommodate its low-to-moderate income population. Utiliz-
ing the Berenson test, the court found that the ordinance, by
virtue of its wide variety of different types and densities of resi-
dential housing, provided a properly balanced and well ordered
plan for the community, and satisfied the first prong of that
analysis.2 75 Because the multi-family housing which was permit-
ted in numerous zones required the issuance of a special permit,
the court was required to examine the town's actions in order to
determine whether the special permit provisions had been ap-
plied in a manner which allows for the construction of different
types of housing, or was merely subterfuge to impress the courts.
Reviewing the statistics of permits granted, the court concluded
that the procedure had not been employed as a ruse to prevent
the construction of multi-family housing.
With respect to the question of satisfaction of regional
housing needs, the court found that Berenson "merely requires
that a town allow for the construction of different types of hous-
ing in sufficient numbers for those people who want and can af-
ford it."2 76 The court reiterated its holding in Blitz that its re-
view was limited to whether the ordinance allows the
construction of sufficient housing to meet the municipality's
share of the regional need, assuming that the construction of the
units is both physically and economically feasible. The appellate
division repudiated the contention that a balanced and well-or-
dered community requires an array of housing sufficient to meet
the legitimate needs of all the town's residents and others at
prices they can afford.2 77 The court noted that Berenson ap-
proached the problem of exclusionary zoning solely in terms of
traditional zoning and planning considerations, and did not ad-
dress how such housing would be built, affordability, subsidies,
"nor does it purport to mandate that a zoning ordinance make it
possible for people of all classes to live in a given community. It
merely requires that a town allow for the construction of differ-
ent types of housing in sufficient numbers for those people who
275. Id. at 328-29, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 400.
276. Id. at 331, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
277. Id.
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want and can afford it. '2 78 In affirming the validity of the town's
ordinance, the court noted that the court of appeals has not an-
nounced a constitutional obligation on the part of municipalities
to zone for low-to-moderate income housing.7 9
The court in Asian American for Equality v. Koch,280 spe-
cifically declined to follow the second department's unambigu-
ous rejection of the Mount Laurel principles and held that "it is
now appropriate to adopt the Mount Laurel Doctrine as the law
of New York. 21 8 1 In Asian American for Equality, the plaintiffs
challenged New York City's creation of a Special Manhattan
Bridge District, alleging that it constituted a plan of neighbor-
hood gentrification in order to exclude and displace low-income
Chinese persons from Chinatown and New York City in favor of
upper-income individuals. Recognizing a severe housing shortage
in the area, the city devised an incentive program to promote
residential development, relying primarily upon floor area bo-
nuses to developers who provide certain community facilities,
such as community space, rehabilitation of existing housing and
subsidized housing. The approval which stimulated the proceed-
ing was the granting of a special permit for the construction of a
twenty-one story building containing eighty-seven condominium
units ranging in price from $170,000 to $500,000. In order to ob-
tain a floor area bonus, the developer agreed to construct a pool
on the premises to be conveyed to the YMCA and to contribute
$500,000 for the rehabilitation of subsidy housing.
The court observed that New York's attempts to satisfy the
need for adequate housing for low-and-middle income individu-
als, by focusing on whether there exists a properly balanced and
well ordered plan for the development of the community, has
not resulted in the construction of such housing. The court
found that "[t]he underpinnings of the Mount Laurel Doctrine
and the Berenson doctrine are the same, 2 82 that is, that the po-
lice power delegation to zone must be exercised for the general
welfare of all citizens. The court denied the City's motion to dis-
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Asian American for Equality v. Koch, 129 Misc. 2d 67, 492 N.Y.S.2d 837 (1985).
281. Id. at 82, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 848.
282. Id. at 81, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 847.
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miss the complaint finding that a cause of action had been
stated under both the Mount Laurel and Berenson standards.
The history and social structure of Chinatown is such that
its residents, most of whom fall into the low-income category,
are deeply rooted into the community. It was asserted that the
displacement of these residents by the implementation of zoning
schemes would be so traumatic, that it would preclude any rea-
sonable opportunity for the future development of low-and-
moderate income housing in Chinatown. 83 Thus, although the
zoning scheme was designed to aid Chinatown's low-income resi-
dents, it would, in essence, be contrary to their general welfare.
The court held that if the plaintiffs are able to prove that the
amendment would lead to unwarranted displacements, and that
it circumvents the City's obligation to affirmatively provide a re-
alistic opportunity for the construction of low-income housing,
plaintiffs may prevail at trial.2 8' "[T]he zoning power is no more
abused by keeping out the region's poor than by forcing out the
resident poor. 2 85 The court rejected the City's argument that
the provision of incentive bonuses in the amendment required a
holding that it is valid as a matter of law. The Mount Laurel H
court determined that there may be instances when incentive
devices alone may not be sufficient, and that more extensive
measures may be required. Accordingly, the court determined
that the issue must be explored at trial.86
Additionally, the court found that a cause of action under
the Berenson analysis was stated by the allegations: that the
amendment ignored the critical need for low-income housing
and would, instead, result only in luxury housing, thereby violat-
ing the constitutional mandate that the police power be utilized
only in furtherance of the public welfare; and that it does not
constitute a well-balanced plan. 87 The court held that although
a particular quantitative proportion of various types of housing
is not required by Berenson, the particular needs of Chinatown
283. Id. at 83-85, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 848-49.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 83, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 848 (quoting Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 214, 456
A.2d at 418).
286. Mount Laurel H, 92 N.J. 158, 266-67, 456 A.2d 390, 445-46 (1983).
287. Asian American for Equality v. Koch, 129 Misc. 2d at 85-86, 492 N.Y.S.2d at
849-50.
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may mandate that a well-balanced plan facilitate the construc-
tion of quality low-income housing.2 88 Accordingly, issues were
raised with respect to the first prong of the Berenson test which
required resolution at trial. Additionally, the trial court would
be required to explore whether the needs of the community can
be satisfied by neighboring communities, whether it would be
appropriate in view of the unique character of Chinatown, and
the possible effects that displacement would have on its
residents.289
Subsequently, the second department utilized the Berenson
analysis to determine that an ordinance which excluded multi-
family housing for the elderly was not exclusionary. In North
Shore Unitarian Universalist Society v. Village of Upper
BrookviUle,290 the court first held that the plaintiffs had failed to
prove that the ordinance did not provide for the present and
future needs of the village's residents, that is, that it did not
constitute a properly balanced and well-ordered plan.291 With
respect to the second Berenson prong, the court relied upon the
Nassau-Suffolk Comprehensive Development Plan in determin-
ing whether the plaintiff proved the existence of a regional need
for high-density housing for the elderly, and whether such need
was adequately satisfied. The Plan did not designate any high-
density development for the village, but recommended low-den-
sity development to preserve the village's present open space.
Similarly, low-density development was recommended for the
village by a water management study which classified the area as
a primary source of drinking water for both counties. Further-
more, the court found that the Plan provided for the develop-
ment of sufficient housing elsewhere, and that the ordinance
served a regional need for open space and water preservation.
The court also rejected the contention that the ordinance is
insufficient because the Plan's projected number of apartments
had not been constructed.
[A] facially valid ordinance will not be invalidated simply be-
288. Id. at 88, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 851.
289. Id.
290. North Shore Unitarian Universalist Society v. Village of Upper Brookville, 110
A.D.2d 123, 493 N.Y.S.2d 564 (2d Dep't 1985).
291. Id. at 125-28, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 565-68.
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cause economic forces prevent construction of multi-family hous-
ing. Moreover, a requirement that those seeking to build either
multi-family housing or age-restricted multi-family housing must
first seek a permit to do so does not destroy the presumptive va-
lidity of zoning ordinances which do not premap to provide for
such housing.2 92
IV. Conclusion
Although there are a number of similarities between the
Mount Laurel decisions and the New York exclusionary zoning
cases, the distinctions are quite profound. Among the common
bases in both lines of decisions is the requirement that all zoning
regulations be in furtherance of the public welfare. As is evident,
however, the two states have interpreted the implications of that
mandate in a different manner.
Additionally, the placement of responsibility for the provi-
sion of low-cost housing in New Jersey and the placement of re-
sponsibility for the furtherance of regional planning in New
York has been placed in the legislature, not the courts. The
Mount Laurel II court recognized that:
[T]he matter is better left to the Legislature. We act first and
foremost because the Constitution of our State requires protec-
tion of the interests involved and because the Legislature has not
protected them .... So while we have always preferred legislative
to judicial action in this field, we shall continue - until the Legis-
lature acts - to do our best to uphold the constitutional obligation
that underlies the Mount Laurel doctrine.2 93
The Berenson court, on the other hand, looked to the New York
State Legislature to make appropriate changes in order to foster
the development, not of low-cost housing, but of sound regional
planning.
Of considerable importance in both instances is the reliance
upon regional planning studies. Mount Laurel, of course, is pre-
mised upon the utilization of the SDGP as a rational long-range
land use planning blueprint for future growth, and for the im-
plementation of the Mount Laurel doctrine. Although the SDGP
292. Id. at 128, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 567.
293. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 212, 456 A.2d at 417.
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has been criticized as "merely reflect[ing] present development
throughout the state, concentrating on 'what is' rather than
'what ought to be,' ,,294_ it is, at least, an attempt at rational
regional planning. Since the Berenson decision, New York courts
have, in fact, placed great reliance on various regional planning
documents which "illustrate the approach to regional zoning
problems which was favored in Berenson.' '295 In Blitz, for exam-
ple, the court found that the County Board of Legislators re-
sponded to the Berenson call for legislative action by adopting
the report of a blue-ribbon committee, formed to study long-
range land use planning as the Board's county housing policy.
Thus, the report and its finding of the regional housing need
gained further validity. 29" Similarly, in North Shore Unitarian
Universalist Society, the court, in order to examine whether a
regional need exists for multi-unit or high-density housing for
the elderly, and whether that need has been satisfied, accorded
great deference to the Nassau-Suffolk Comprehensive Develop-
ment Plan, and, to a lesser extent, a water management study.297
Such presumptive validity to which planning studies are entitled
should serve as a great impetus for the preparation of reports.
Regardless of the underlying similarity of theory, Berenson
and its progeny and the Mount Laurel decisions exhibit many
distinctive features which distinguish the course of the judicial
determinations. First of all, while Mount Laurel has resulted in
a veritable revolution in New Jersey zoning planning and proce-
dure, and has certainly increased the housing stock for the poor,
Berenson has had little effect in New York, with the possible
exception of the beleaguered Town of New Castle. While New
Jersey communities must provide for their fair share of housing
for the region's poor, New York municipalities need merely pro-
vide an array of housing as required by regional needs for those
who can afford such housing. Equally important, New York
courts have refused to adopt a fair share doctrine which would
294. Carton and Brown, An Open Letter to Municipalities, III New Jersey State
Bar Association, Land Use Section, No. 1, Aug. 1983.
295. Robert E. Kurzius, Inc. v. Village of Upper Brookville, 51 N.Y.2d at 347, 414
N.E.2d at 685, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 184.
296. Blitz v. Town of New Castle, 94 A.D.2d at 97, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 835.
297. North Shore Unitarian Universalist Society, 110 A.D.2d at 126-28, 493
N.Y.S.2d at 566-67.
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impose specific unit goals or quotas of housing on a municipal-
ity, and have examined instead relevant data which may indi-
cate whether a municipality's provisions for housing are com-
mensurate with "some general notion" 9 8 of its expected
contribution to the regional housing need. No affirmative obliga-
tion is imposed to promote low-income housing. New Jersey
communities must satisfy their numerical fair share regardless of
bona fide efforts. New York municipalities, on the other hand,
need merely provide by their ordinances for the construction of
its share of the regional housing need. Moreover, unlike New
Jersey townships, New York municipalities are not required to
eliminate cost producing regulations which might not serve the
public interest.
Will the Mount Laurel doctrine become the law of New
York? There are a number of reasons why it is unlikely that
such an extreme position will be adopted by the New York
courts. It can safely be assumed, however, that the Mount Lau-
rel decisions will continue to influence the manner in which the
courts view the issue of exclusionary zoning disputes. In the first
instance, Mount Laurel H was the result of the supreme court's
perception of "widespread non-compliance with the constitu-
tional mandate"2 99 of Mount Laurel I on the part of New
Jersey's municipalities. The history of exclusionary zoning has
been far different in New York - invalidation of a zoning ordi-
nance as a result of exclusionary zoning has been the rarest of
exceptions. Only in Berenson, when the doctrine of exclusionary
zoning was first announced, and in Asian American for Equal-
ity, an anomoly to date, have ordinances been declared invalid.
There has been no history of non-compliance with the less de-
manding Berenson standard. Moreover, the instances in which
New York courts have so pervasively intervened in the affairs of
a municipality are, indeed, rare. In the field of local zoning, it is
virtually unprecedented. Accordingly, the fashioning of such a
draconic remedy in New York is unwarranted.
Moreover, the wisdom and legitimacy of mandating that ra-
tional planning take a subservient position to a judicially created
constitutional right to low-cost housing is, at best, debatable. It
298. Blitz, 94 A.D.2d at 98, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 836.
299. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 199, 456 A.2d at 410.
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cannot be argued that fundamental fairness requires that a mu-
nicipality not exclude multiple family housing where a regional
need for the same exists, and where valid planning considera-
tions and criteria can be met. To require, however, that a munic-
ipality violate its own comprehensive plan and ignore valid zon-
ing regulations, which had previously been considered to be
presumptively valid, defies logic. Further, the Berensen doctrine
certainly is more consistent with traditional notions of providing
a rational zoning scheme commensurate with the housing re-
quirements of all segments of the regional community.
Although it cannot be doubted that a significant amount of
low and moderate income housing has and will result in New
Jersey as a result of Mount Laurel, the mandates of Mount Lau-
rel may not be the most efficient means to create affordable
housing. "As paradoxical as it may seem, one of the most effec-
tive methods of undermining the goals of the Mount Laurel H
decision may be enthusiastic compliance by the municipality." 300
Under such a scenario, utilizing mandatory set asides and
overzoning, techniques favored by the New Jersey courts, a mu-
nicipality could require a high number percentage of mandatory
set-asides in virtually all of its undeveloped residential land.301
"This device will immediately discourage all development by
most small builders who do not want to get involved in the po-
tential risk, prohibitive legal fees, and high administrative costs,
and unnececessary red tape incurred the implementation of an
affirmative measures program. 3 0 2 With respect to larger devel-
opments, the consequence of such over-enthusiastic compliance
would result in "severely limiting the economic feasibility and
diminishing, if not eliminating, any developer interest." 303 In
short, Mount Laurel will only be effective with respect to munic-
ipalities which react to its mandates in good faith and for devel-
opers who have the stamina to engage in time-consuming and
finance-depleting litigation.
It cannot be argued that a severe housing shortage does not
exist in New York for those of modest income, as well as for the
300. Rose, supra note 21, at 882.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1986, at B4, col. 3.
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rest of society. The Mount Laurel decisions are certainly having
an impact on how the New York courts view zoning ordinances
which fail to allow multiple family housing, particularly when
the poor are excluded from a community and when the less for-
tunate are displaced by housing for the well-to-do. It is equally
clear that the influence of Mount Laurel will continue to have
an impact on the law in New York, particularly since Berenson
has not produced additional housing for the poor and, in all like-
lihood, has not resulted in the construction of additional housing
of any nature, except in North Castle.
Utilization of Mount Laurel standards in New York would
prevent many municipalities from preserving the essential char-
acter of the community. As suburban sprawl continues to devour
open spaces and green areas, city dwellers continue to seek such
environments in which to raise families, and natives seek to per-
petuate the remaining bucolic elements of the area. Perhaps,
what is needed is a mix of communities of varying characteris-
tics to suit the needs and lifestyles of a diverse society, rather
than a wide variety of housing in every municipality, be it large
or small. Judicial intrusion into a community's development is
clearly a remedy of last resort. The type of comprehensive, ra-
tional planning illustrated in North Shore Unitarian Universal-
ist Society may facilitate such intelligent location of denser de-
velopment and preservation of green areas. New York should
not be permitted to drift in the direction of Mount Laurel as the
result of legislative default.
Promotion of purely parochial interests, on the other hand,
without any semblance of regional concern cannot serve the
public interest. Displacement of the poor to pursue gentrifica-
tion, without efforts to accommodate the resultant homeless
must be considered to be the antithesis of sound planning, as
well as inhumane. The right of luxury urban development at
high density should entail the responsibility for those displaced.
Increased densities of market-rate units may provide the capital
to renovate dilapitated housing or to subsidize dwelling units.
The Mount Laurel trial court decisions discussed herein re-
flect a very concerted effort by the trial judges to bring rational-
ity and certainty to an uncertain area in which experts can de-
bate the wisdom of various methodologies far into the future.
The conclusion must be reached that a fair degree of caprice
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must exist in any method chosen. It is clear, however, that plan-
ners can construct a model which will bear some relationship to
reality. The trial court decisions reveal that after trial and error,
a system for allocation, however imprecise, can be implemented
which will determine need and allocate the same. The more seri-
ous question is whether such an obligation should be imposed,
entailing such intrusive interference with functions which have
traditionally been considered to be of local concern. The unpop-
ularity of the Mount Laurel II decision in New Jersey suggests
that the public support for such a supposed constitutional right
and the concomitant remedies is clearly lacking. The Fair Hous-
ing Act was an effort to escape some of the more intrusive fea-
tures of Mount Laurel litigation with the intention to "put the
power to determine housing needs back where it belongs-back
in the hands of local, elected officials." 30 " Moreover, Governor
Kean has proposed a constitutional amendment to eliminate the
Mount Laurel constitutional obligation to provide low and mod-
erate income housing. Given New Jersey's attempts to circum-
vent the court mandated Mount Laurel obligation, it certainly
can be argued that other states can learn from New Jersey's ex-
periences and attempt a different approach to satisfying the
housing needs of the citizens of the community and region.
If New Jersey is successful in abrogating the Mount Laurel
doctrine, the impact of Mount Laurel on land use planning will
not be significantly lessened. The determination of the existence
of such a constitutional right and the judicial administration of
Mount Laurel litigation should provide guidance to other juris-
dictions in coping with that serious dilemma. Although it is rec-
ognized that strictly insular zoning must be a relic of the past,
the intrusive impact of Mount Laurel should be sought to be
avoided in the future.
304. Id. at B4, col. 4.
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